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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The importance of communication in every aspect of
behavior is widely recognized.

Communicative activities

pervade virtually everything with which human beings are
concerned, and it is often said that symbolic communication
is the most fundamental distinguishing characteristic of
the human species.^

Indeed, as Wiener states, communica

tion M. . . belong/s/-to the essence of man’s inner life,
even as £itj belong/s7 to his life in society, ” 2

In sci

ence, and particularly in the social and behavioral sci
ences, communication stands out as a principal, and perhaps
a unifying, concept.3*4 Modern science, however, tends to
be quantitative.5 Although the qualitative observations of
philosophers, psychologists, and rhetoricians have played
a role in the history of the study of communication, these

1Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings {Gar
den City, New fork: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954), pp* 62-03*
2 Ibid.. p. 10 ,

3colin Cherry, On Human Communication (Mew York:
Science Editions, Inc,,■1901), p. 2.
^Charles W, Morris, "Foundations of the Theory of
Signs," International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,
Vol. 1, No. 2 {Chicago, III.: The University of -Chicago
Press, 1930), p. 54ff.
5j. R, Wilson, An Introduction to Scientific Research
{New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co,, Inc., 1952), p. 23.

2
efforts resulted in few testable theories about communica
tive phenomena and provided little that could be said with
scientific certainty.
The Mature and Importance of the Study
With the recent mathematical developments which come
under the heading of the "Theory of Communication,” a method
of quantifying some communicative activities was intro
duced. 6

One of the most widely known of these formulations

is that most often associated with Claude E. Shannon, re
ferred to as "Information Theory,”? Although the theory
had its origins in the study of electrical eommuncation,^
several of the basic concepts were quickly adapted for the
psychological analyses of human behavior,9,10
As a mathematical formulation, information theory
proceeds from clear definitions and assumptions to theorems

^Cherry, p, 2,
?Use of the term "information theory" had been widely
criticized, primarily due to the association of information
with meaningful material. As shall be seen, however, "in
formation" in the context of the theory to be discussed has
a very specific reference and its use is highly restricted,
R. Pierce, Symbols, Signals» and Moise (Hew York:
Harper.and Hoe, Publishers, 1961), p . 24.
^G. A, Miller and P. C, Frick, "Statistical Behavioristics and Sequences of Responses," Psychological Review. 56
(1949), 311-324.
A. Miller and J. A, Selfridge, "Verbal Context
and the Recall of Meaningful Material," American Journal of
Psychology» 63 (1950), 176-165.

concerning information sources, communication channels, and
"noise, ” 11

The validity of applying the theorems, then, to

behavioral research is directly dependent on whether, in
fact, the definitions and assumptions have logical corre
lates in the experimental situation. 12

As Chronbach points

out, "A use of information theory may be taken seriously
only when the author shows a specified rationale for des
cribing his data by Shannon*s measure."1^ Several studies
have dealt with the validity of applying information theory
techniques to experimental psychology;H ,15»16 and insofar
as the study of interpersonal communication is a behavioral
science, the parameters of applicability of information
theory analyses to interpersonal communication research
have been, to this extent, already discussed.
While, however, there is a certain similarity be
tween the psychological studies employing informational
analyses and those in interpersonal communication, Luce
11 Pierce, p. 18,

1^Colin Cherry, "On the Validity of Applying Com
munication Theory to Experimental Psychology,” British
Journal of Psychology, 4$ (1957), 176-1BB,
1^Lee J, Chronbach, "On the Mon-Rational Application
of Information Measures in Psychology,” Information Theory
in Psychology, ed. Henry Quastler (Glencoe, 111.: The Free
IbressV 1955), p. 24.
1^Arnold Binder and Burton R. Wolin, "Informational
Models and Their Uses,” Psvehometrika, 29 (1964), 29-54.
^5cherry, "On the Validity-—
<0 Chronbach,
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points out that little of the work in psychology has been
concerned with problems traditionally classed as communi
cation.^

Many psychological studies employing information

theory, for example, deal with such traditional psychologi
cal problems as reaction time,1& pattern perception,^ and
intelligence tests. 20

It is recognized, of course, that

the distinction between communication-oriented psychological
research and behaviorally-oriented communication research
is at best vague and unclear.21

There appears to be, how

ever, a clear distinction between reaction time studies—
a traditional research problem in psychology— and speech
and language studies, more often completed in communication
programs.

Again, however, it must be stressed that the

distinction drawn is not so much one of academic disciplines

1?R. Duncan Luce, nThe Theory of Selective Informa
tion and Some of its Behavioral Applications,w Developments
in Mathematical Psychology. ed. E, Duncan Luce (Glencoe,""
111.: The Free Press, 1960),. p. 51.
1%. E. Hick, "On the Rate of Gain of Information,"
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 4 (1952),
Ti-2o.
1^E. T. Elemmer and F. C. Frick, "Assimilation of
Information from Dot and Matrix Patterns," Journal of Ex
perimental Psychology. 45 (1953)* 15-19.
E. Hick, "Information Theory and Intelligence
Tests," British Journal of Psychology* 4 (1951)* 157-164.
21 It is to be noted, by way of clarification of this
issue, that much, if not most, of the work in information
theory which might well be thought of as communication re
search has been undertaken by psychologists.
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as one of types of research efforts, methods of investiga
tion, and more importantly, the phenomena which are investi
gated.

To the degree that interpersonal communication

research, specifically concerned with the process of commu
nication, is distinct from other behavioral research, the
criteria provided for the application of informational
analyses will be different.

As of 1968, there appears to

be no statement of the criteria for applying information
theory rationale to behavioral investigations of interper
sonal communication.
As previously mentioned, the application of infor
mation theory as a model is predicated on the correspondence
between the definitions and assumptions of the mathematical
theory and the research situation.

Given the definitions

and assumptions, then, a problem which immediately arises
is that of determining under what research conditions these
definitions and assumptions do have correspondence.

That

is, it is necessary to determine if and how the definitions
and assumptions have logical correlates in specific research
situations.

Moreover, It would be of considerable assis

tance to the researcher if some broad criteria could be
provided for determining if any particular piece of commu
nication research has, in fact, logical correlates between
the research situation and the definitions and assumptions.
Future researchers intending to use information theory

6
could then become aware of some of the problems they might
encounter during the course of their investigation and, per
haps, devise methods by which these problems might be allevi
ated.
The Purpose of the Study
The purposes of the thesis are to:
1,

Review the historical and mathematical back

grounds of information theory}
2,

State the basic assumptions of the theory}

3*

Briefly review the literature of applications

of information theory in some types of research;
4,

Analyze a number of selected studies in inter

personal communication research which employ information
theory, determining if and why (or why not) those studies
show logical correlates between the assumptions of the
theory and the experimental design; and
3, Formulate, from the analyses of the studies,
some general problems and problem areas which an investigator
might meet in the course of an informational study in inter
personal communication research.
Limitations of the Study
The sheer magnitude of the literature utilizing in
formation theory techniques, as well as the practical limi
tations of time placed upon this researcher, prohibits any

7

complete survey of the literature in communication research.
Moreover, informational concepts are often employed for the
analyses of phenomena (such as in speech signal analysis)
which require a technical competence beyond that of this
researcher*

For these and other reasons, it has been deemed

prudent to generally limit the scope of this study, in keep
ing with the purposes stated above, to selected studies in
traditional Interpersonal communication research which employ
information theory analysis.

The selection of the studies

was dependent, in large part, on the intuitive feeling of
the author concerning which studies best illustrate a par
ticular type of application, although an attempt has been
made, beyond this, to cover as wide a range of research as
possible.
The study will not be concerned with detailed treat
ments of electrical communication systems, statistical and
mathematical developments based on information measures
and theory, or, in general, the analysis of speech signals
such as in experimental phonetics and acoustics*

The review

of the literature in the area is similarly limited.

There

are several important journals in the area of the experi
mental study of communicative activities which have not
been perused since it was felt that the technical background
necessary in order to undertake a critical analysis of those
studies was beyond that of this researcher.

CHAPTER II
THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF "INFORMATION THEORY’1
In the last section the need for some criteria for
the valid application of informational analyses was dis
cussed, and the purpose of the paper was defined relative
to those criteria.

In this chapter an examination of the

nature of information theory will be undertaken by providing
an historical context, a review of the system which infor
mation theory presupposes, and a discussion of the theory
itself, especially with reference to its assumptions.
A Hrief Historical Review

The study of communicative processes is by no means
new.

From the times of the ancients to the present, the

significance of symbolic behavior has held the attention
of scholars from virtually every area of interest.

Phil

osophers, rhetoricians, social thinkers, and others have
been concerned with the effects that speech and language
have on the behavior of the speaker as well as the listener.
Science, too, has had a long-standing interest in the phe
nomena.

As Wiener says, ’’The place of the study of commu

nication in the history of science is neither trivial, for
tuitous, nor new.

Even before Newton, such problems were

current in physics. . .
1Wiener, p. 18.

•9Through electrical communication, however, consider
able impetus was provided for the development of the statis
tical aspects of signal transmission.

Samuel F. B. Morse,

in developing his widely used telegraph code, became one of
the first persons to utilize the statistical dimension of
language for increasing the efficiency of transmission.^
Morris constructed a two-state code based on the relative
frequency of occurrence of the letters of the English alpha
bet.

Although his estimates of the frequency of occurrence

of the letters were found using the relatively crude method
of counting the quantities of type used in a printer's of
fice, Morse's code was well suited to minimizing the time
necessary for the transmission of English phrases.

This

code, however, was based on descriptive statistics; what
communication engineers needed was an exact measure of in
formation transmitted.3
One of the first important contributions to the de
velopment of such a measure was that of H. Nyquist in 1924.
Myquist published an article in the Bell System Technical
Journal which considered ,!two fundamental factors entering
into the maximum speed of transmission of intelligence by

2Cherry, On Human Communication. p. 35.
3 Ibid., p. 33-35.

telegraph . . . signal shaping and choice of codes."4” Some
four years later, E. V. L. Hartley, in the same journal,
suggested "a quantitative measure of *information1 . , *
based on physical as contrasted with psychological consider
ations."^

This measure, now common to much of the work in

communication theory, is given by taking "as our practical
measure of information the logarithm of the number of pos
sible symbol sequences.As Cherry points out, Hartleyfs
definition is derived by showing
that a message of M signs chosen from an "alphabet” or
code book of S signs has Sjl possibilities and that the
"quantity of information"" is most reasonably defined
as the logarithm, that is, H = N log S.7
It is Hartley*s work which may be regarded as the genesis
of modern communication theory.^
Following the publication of this article, however,
a silent period lasting some twenty years began, to be

^H. Myquist, "Certain Factors Affecting Telegraph
Speed," Bell System Technical Journal, 3 (1925), p. 324.
5h . ?. L, Hartley, "Transmission of Information,"
Bell System Technical Journal. 7 {192$), 535-563, p. 535.
6 Ibid., p. 540 .

?Cberry, On Human Communication. p. 43*
%bid.
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broken only occasionally by some work in statistics.9*10
In 1946 Gabor took up the idea of "uncertainty” in an
article entitled "Theory of Communicationintroducing the
concept of the "logon,” or the basic element
into which such complex signals such as speech may
be analysed and upon which a representation of the
signals must be based. . , . Such a basic element is
the smallest which can be consideredj it is regarded
as a "unit of structural information, ” 11
The maturation of the basic concepts of information
theory into a rigorous formalized theory was chiefly the
result of the efforts of Norbert Wiener of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and his former student, Claude E.
Shannon of the Bell Telephone Laboratories,

In a two-part

paper entitled "A Mathematical Theory of Communication,"^
Shannon pointed out that both Myquist and Hartley had seen
the need for a measure of information based on the number
of alternative possibilities and which was also logarithmic.
Garner adds:
Shannon made two critical contributions to these ideas.
The first was to- treat the problem in a more general

(London:

^Sir Ronald Fisher, The Design of Experiments,
Oliver and Boyd, 1935)*

1%, A. Fisher, Statistical Method for Research
Workers (10th ed.; Edinburgh": Oliver and Boyd , 1946'T.
Ucherry, On Human Communication, p. 43*
12Claude E. Shannon, "A Mathematical Theory of
Communication,” Bell System Technical Journal» 27 (1.94$)
pp. 379, 623,

'
\
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statistical sense, so that we no longer have Just num
ber of categories or possible messages, but we have each
category or message with a stated probability of occur
rence, The second was to provide a method for dealing
with the effects of noise in a communication system,
As Wiener had predicted,14 the concepts of communi
cation theory were soon shown to have relevance far beyond
their intended scope in electrical communication.

Among the

first to see the broad potential for information theory was
Warren Weaver, who wrote a short, non-technical exposition
of Shannon’s formulations, and some additional implications,
for the Scientific American.^

This article, in an expanded

and somewhat more complete version, was later published to
gether with Shannon’s original work in book form,16 and has
since been recognised as a "classic” in communication theory.
Within a year after the publication of this book,
the psychologists Miller and Frick had employed information
measures in the analysis of sequential behavior,17 A steady
increase in the use of the new "informational analysis” in
psychological as well as other areas of research continued

1^Wendell R, Garner, Uncertainty and Structure as
Psychological Concepts (Hew York: John Wiley and Sons,
1962)', p* 9*"
1^Herbert Wiener, Cybernetics (Hew York:
and Sons, Inc•, 1943),

John Wiley

1%arren Weaver, "The Mathematics of Communication,”
Scientific American. 1§1 (1949), pp, 11-15,
^shannon and Weaver,
1^Miller and Frick.
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until about 1954, when an apparent plateau was reached in
applications of the measures in behavioral research.1^ The
rapid expansion in the use of the concepts of information
theory in psychology, as Garner suggests, may in part be
attributable to the mathematical Zeitgeist in psychology
during the years around and folloifing 194 $.^

In any case,

this increase of interest in information theory led to
several symposia on the subject and its applications in
various disciplines,20 a large number of books and articles,21
and to the publication of at least two journals which are
largely devoted to the theory and its developments•22
A Communication System
The formalization of Shannon’s mathematical theory
/

of communication is predicated on a particular model of a

1%,uce, p. 51*
1^Garner.
2^At least three such symposia have been published
by Butterworths in London. See, for example, Colin Cherry
(ed.), Information Theory Fourth London Symposium (London;
Butterworths, 1961), especially the ’'Preface,1' p.v.
21 Several relatively complete bibliographies of
information theory have already been published. For example,
see F. L. Stumpers, ,fA Bibliography of Information Theory
(Communication Theory— Cybernetics)Transactions of the
Institute of Radio Engineers. Professional Group on Infor
mation fheoryT 1953, 1.
22Information and Control and the above mentioned
Transactions or the Institute. . . «
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communication system.

As Walker says of models:

The essential content of the concept of model is the
existence of a correspondence between the model itself
and the prototype. , . ,
Models do not always have to be invented or construc
ted, but they do have to be recognized.23
Very briefly, Shannon’s model consists of (1) a
source« which selects series of signals or messages from
a known set of possible messages {whose probabilities are
also known); (2 ) a transmitter. or sender, which translates
the message selected by the source into a signal capable
of being transmitted (i.e., "matches" the message to the
channel); (3 ) a channel, or transmitting medium; (4 ) ©
receiver, which changes the transmitted signal back into
a message and hands it on, finally, to the (5 ) destination.
or the end-point in the system.

It often happens in the

transmission of the message from the source to the destina
tion that undesirable signals are introduced, thus distort
ing the message.

These signals or distortions are referred

to as "noise," and will be discussed at some length later.
This communication system is illustrated in Figure 1.

Since

it happens that the model there shown is of particular
interest with respect to an analysis of the assumptions of
the the theory, it shall be helpful to quote Shannon

^Marshall Walker, The Mature of Scientific Thought.
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), P« 3.

15

Figure 1
information
source

transmitter

receiver

signal

destination

received
signal

message

extensively with respect to it:
By a communication system we will mean a system of
the type indicated consisting of essentially five parts:
1* An information source which produces a message or
sequence of messages to be communicated to the receiving
terminal. The message may be of various types: (a) a
sequence of letters as in a telegraph or teletype sys
tem; (b) a single function of time f(t) as in radio or
telephony. . . .
2. A transmitter which operates on the message in
some way to produce a signal suitable for transmission
over the channel. In telephony this operation consists
merely of changing sound pressure into a proportional
electrical current. In telegraphy we have an encoding
operation which produces a sequence of dots, dashes, and
spaces on the channel corresponding to the message. . . .
3. The channel is merely the medium used to transmit
the signal from transmitter to receiver. It may be a
pair of wires, a coaxial cable, a band of radio frequen
cies, a beam of light, etc. During transmission, or at
one of the terminals, the signal may be perturbed by
noise. This is indicated . . . by the noise source

16

acting on the transmitted signal to produce the received
signal.24
4. The receiver ordinarily performs the inverse
operation of that done by the transmitter, reconstruct
ing the message from the signal,
5. The destination is the person (or thing) for
whom the message is intended.2?
It is clear that this model has as its prototype a
physical communication system.

Applications of information

theory in behavioral research, however, are predicated on
the correspondence of this model to experimental conditions.
While it is true, as Walker says, that "a single correspon
dence is often enough to provide a very useful model,n2^ and
that ”no claim is made about the ’reality* of the model; the
sole criterion is successful predication from simplest, most
convenient, or most satisfying model, ” 27 it is also true, as
Chronbach points out, that:
A considerable burden of proof is assumed when one
argues from the,empirical data that one has a proper
description of nature . . . a burden that is not

24fhe employment of Shannon’s model of a communica
tion system in behavioral research has been subjected to
considerable criticism (much of it justifiable}, One such
criticism often heard is that Shannon’s communication system
does not account for noise introduced at points other than
the channel. As the statement quoted clearly shows, how
ever, this criticism is unjustified. It is likely that much
of the criticism based on this issue resulted from his illus
tration (similar to Figure 1) which shows the noise source
acting only at the channel*

2^Shannon and Weaver, pp. 33-34.
27 Ibid., p, 5 ,

2 %alker» p* 3,

17

shouldered if the measure is advanced on rational
grounds.2®
The adaption of the communication model presupposed
by Shannon to behavioral research necessitates that the sub
ject (s) or the human operator(s) be represented in the model.
Cherry says:
Comparison between a human operator and a communica
tion channel is today commonplace; the stimuli represent
the "input” signals applied to his sense organs, while
his overt responses represent ’’output” signals; the hu
man operator represents the ”transducer.”29
The problems emerging from such a comparison are
numerous and shall be considered later*

In any case, it is

apparent that this model is not the only possible model for
use in either communication research or behavioral investi
gations*

It often happens, in fact, according to some re

searchers, that the model is wholly inadequate.^
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
Fundamental to a scientific investigation of the
process of communication is some means of quantifying that
which is communicated, and that which is communicated may

2 ^Chronbach, p. 16.
2 %herry, ”0n the Validity. . . 9n p. 16.

-^For an excellent review of some of the models of
communication proposed by various researchers, as well as
the reasons for their adaption, see F. Craig Johnson and
George B, Klare, "General Models of Communication Research:
A Survey of the Developments of a Decade, ’1 Journal of Com
munication . 11 (1961 ), 13-2 6 .

1a
be Identified as "information."31

Broadly speaking, there

are three basic aspects of quantifiable information,

The

identification of the first of these aspects can be attributed, in large part, to D, Gabor and is termed structural
information. The primary concern in the measurement of
structural information is the degree of complexity of the
form of a representation.-^

There is, for example, more

structural information in the categorization of something
into one of 100 classes than there is in the categorization
of something into one of 10 classes; this difference is
expressed in "logons,"
A second aspect of information is measured by the
degree of confidence which a description merits.

That is,

there is more information in a statement with an accuracy
of 1 per cent than there is in a statement with an accuracy
of only 10 per cent.

This kind of information is known as

metrical information. and its unit of measurement is the
"matron."
To clarify the third aspect of information, that which
is of fundamental concern in this thesis, it will prove help
ful to draw on an illustration given by Warren Weaver;

3 ^Garner, p. 2 .
3barren Weaver, "Information Theory: 1. Informa
tion Theory to 1951— A Non-Technical Review," Journal of
Speech and Hearing Disorders. 17 (1952), 16o-74•
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A friend tells you something; but you remark after
ward, "I didn’t get much information, because what he
said was almost exactly what I was sure he would say.”
This remark emphasizes, and with shrewd accuracy, that
from one point of view a remark has high informative
content if it is unexpected, the more unexpectedness,
the more information,This is the kind of information
(or the aspect of information) which in present theory
is referred to as selective information. . . . A unit
of selective information is called a bit.33>34
More explicitly, as Garner states:
Any communicative act provides information only insofar
as it reduces a condition of ignorance or uncertainty35
about the state of things under consideration*3©
And:
Information occurs only if there exists some a priori
uncertainty, and the amount of Information is determined
fry frfre amount of uncertainty— or, more exactly, it is
determined by the amount by which the uncertainty has
been reduced. Information and uncertainty are closely
related concepts, and if we can measure uncertainty, we
can measure information as the decrease of uncertainty.
These opposing concepts— uncertainty as a state of ignor
ance, and information as the opposed reduction of

33ibid.. p. 16S.
3^8Ince this paper is concerned only with ”selective
information,” and not with "structural” or "metrical” in
formation, the term "selective" will hereafter be omitted
with the understanding that, unless otherwise stated, it is
"selective information” under consideration.
3^Luce has this to say about the term "uncertainty";
It must be mentioned that this use of the word "uncertainty"
is at variance with its use in (statistical) decision theory.
There, if an a priori probability distribution is known, one
speaks of decision making under risk, and uncertainty is
reserved for these cases where the distribution is not com
pletely known. Thus, if the two vocabularies were to be
consistent, H, information, should be described as an ave
rage measure"*of risk, not of uncertainty.Luce, p. 27.
^Garner, p. 3 .
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uncertainty— are quantitatively the same thing.37
These statements are indicative of some a priori
stipulations which it seems reasonable to impose on whatever
measure of information is proposed.

First, it is intui

tively to be expected that as the number of possible out
comes of an event increases (i.e., as the uncertainty in
creases), the information being sought is that the measure
should be a monotonically increasing function of the number
of possible outcomes*

Second, the measure of information

should show that each successive event adds the same amount
of uncertainty (or certainty), and thus provides the same
amount of information} that is, the measure should be addi
tive.
The measure which satisfies these conditions is a
logarithmic one, of the form
(1.1)

H *» £ log k

where H is the information, k is the number of possible out
comes, and £ is a proportionality constant whose function is
to establish the particular unit of measurement.3® It often
happens that a choice is made between two alternatives (e.g.,
"yes-no,” "on-off,” etc.), and it has become accepted prac
tice to use the logarithm to the base two for this

37ibid.

m e a s u r e ,39

3 %bid., p. 4.

39sesidea satisfying the intuitive feelings which
may seem desirable of a measure of information mentioned
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and to define the unit of measurement in that logarithmic
system so that the proportionality constant becomes 1 , thus
giving
(1.2)

H - log2 k4 0 *41

In the base two system of measurement information is ex
pressed in "bits ,,f a term proposed by J. W. Tukey^ from

above, Shannon adds,
The logarithmic measure is more convenient for various
reasons:
1. It is practically more useful. Parameters of
engineering importance such as time, bandwidth, number of
relays, etc., tend to very lineraly with the logarithm of
the number of possibilities. For example, adding one relay
to a group doubles the number of possible states of the re
lays. It adds 1 to the base 2 logarithm of this number.
Doubling the time roughly squares the number of possible
messages, or doubles the logarithm, etc.
2 . It is nearer to our intuitive feeling as to the
proper measure. This is related to (1) since we intuitively
measure entities by linear comparison with common standards.
One feels, for example, that two punched cards should have
twice the capacity of one for information storage, and two
identical channels twice the capacity of one for transmit
ting information.
3. It is mathematically more suitable. Many of the
limiting operations are simple in terms of the logarithm
but would require clumsy restatement in terms of the number
of possibilities. Shannon and Weaver, p. 32.
^Garner, p. 4 .
^It should be clear that the adoption of the log
arithm to the base 2 is arbitrary, and that, as Garner says,
"any logarithmic system would have served the purpose just
as well. In fact, all measurements of uncertainty and
information can be made in the common system of logarithms
to the base 10. . . ." Garner, p. 5. The name given to
the unit of information when measured in the base 10 system
is the "Hartley."
Shannon and Weaver, p. 32.
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the contraction of the two words "binary digit."
As an illustrative example of what this formula
represents, a set of elements (sides of a coin, suits in
a deck of cards, or any such case where the probability of
selection of the elements are equally likely) might be
considered.

If there are n elements, and n is of the form

2— (as in the two cases above), where N is an integer (in

the above cases, 1 and 2 respectively), then it can be shown
that there are no more than N bits of information conveyed
when an element is chosen from this set.^

When n «* 2— ,

then N “ logg n by definition of the logarithm, and thus in
this situation there are log2 n bits of information per element.
As Pierce points out, however:
This measure is acceptable in the light of our present
knowledge of information theory only if successive sym
bols are chosen independently and if any of the symbols
is equally likely to be selected* 45
In most cases of selection, it happens that one of
the elements of the set from which the selection is made is
more or less likely to be selected than some of the others,

^Use of the term "bit" has come under some criti
cism due to its continued association with the phrase "bit
of information,” To avoid these difficulties, Goldman has
suggested the term "binit,,! (S. Goldman, Information Theory,
/lew York: Prentice-Hall, 195^7)» but "bit" came into such
wide-spread acceptance and usage that it was defined by an
Institute of Radio Engineers Standards Committee in 195$,
Garner, p, 4.
^Luee, pp, 14-15*
^Pierce, p, 4 0 .
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Luce, in this context, says:
A moment’s reflection about English will suggest
two important statistical facts about many sources:
1, There is no reason to suppose that the probabil
ity that one symbol will be selected is the same as
that for another symbol: the letter !iz" is much less
frequently used in English than is ”e."
2, In general, the choice of one symbol in the
middle of a message will not be independent of the
preceding choices: although an ”e” has a high a priori
probability of being chosen, the probability is markedly
increased if the letters "automobil" have been re
ceived.^
In order to deal with the first case, those situa
tions in which some symbols may be selected more commonly
than others, it is necessary to introduce a measure of
average uncertainty.
If there is a single variable, x, which can take any
value x^t where 1 = 1 to k, and if each value has p (x^)
chance of occurring, then the information associated with
th. selection of any particular x t is given as
(1.3)

H “ - log,, p(x,).^7»4S

It can be seen that this formula has a very reasonable

^Luee, p. 19 .

^Garner,p. 2 0 .

^%he minus sign on the right hand side of this
equation is the result of a characteristic of logarithms;
that is, the logarithm of a number less than 1 is always
negative. Since probabilities are always less than or
equal to 1 , the minus sign serves to multiply the right
side of the equation by -1 , thereby rendering the result
positive. This makes for easier computation and more
"sensible” answers, since if this step were not taken,
one would end up with "negative information."
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property} that is, when the probability, p{x^), that event
Xj_ will be selected is very high (approaches 1 ), then the
information

transmitted by that selection is very low5

and similarly, if the probability is low, the information
is high.

Obviously, if all x^ have equal chance of occur

ring, then the above formula gives the identical result as
in 1 .2 .
Using this formula, it is possible to determine the
information transmitted by the selection of any x^ in the
distribution.

Moreover, if all elements have equal prob

ability of selection /i.e., if p(x-j) « pCxg) «*...*= pCx^J/,
then the formula also gives the average amount of informa
tion transmitted per symbol by the whole distribution (since,
if all

have equal probability of occurring, the average

overall elements will be the same as that for any individ
ual element).
On the other hand, if not all of the

have an

equal chance of occurring, then in order to compute the
average information of the entire distribution it is nec
essary to find a weighted average of all of the probabili
ties p(xj_), for all Xj_ in the distribution.

The weighted

average, of course, is obtained simply by multiplying the
probability of occurrence of any x^ by the information
transmitted by the selection of that

Thus, the average

information over the whole distribution is simply the sum
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of the information of each, x^ ^-log2 p(x^J7

multiplied by

its probability of occurrence /p{x^J7:
(1.4)

H = - p{x^JloggpCx^) - p(x2)log2p(x2)
- . . . - pix^Jlog^plxjj.),

or, in mathematical notation,
(1.5)
where

H « - p(xi)log2p(xi),

i a 1, 2, * .. , k A ^
This formula enables one to dealwithsituations

such as those Luce mentions in his first point;

that is,

evaluating the information transmitted when all alterna
tives are not equally likely.

Still, however, the employ

ment of this formula necessitates that the selections be
independent (i.e., that the selection of one element does
not affect the selection of the following element) , The
second statistical fact about English that Luce makes is,
however, that "the choice of one symbol in the middle of
a message will not be independent of the preceding choices.
. .

In order to compute the information transmitted

by such non-independent selections, then, it is necessary
that the formula be modified.

It is not essential that the

derivation for these formulations be discussed in detail,
since the results obtained for the independent case.readily

^Garner, p, 21
^ Luce, p. 19.

-^Pierce, p. 40.
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carry over to the non-independent case.

But first, as Luce

says:
We shall have to assume that the source is homogeneous
in time, so that its statistical character— measured by
any statistical parameter we choose— is the same at one
time as at any other time. Such a source is said to be
stationary and the time series (of symbol selections)
is called a stationary time series. This assumption is
essential to the theory. . . .52
Given this assumption, the definition of information can
be applied with little alteration to the non-independent
source:
(1.6) I

-g

PjPj(I) l o g ^ d )

bits per symbol, where I is the average information per
symbol, 1^ is the information of a symbol generated when
the process is in state j, Pj is the probability that state
j will occur, and p .(i) is the transitional probability that
when the process is in state j the ith of a alternative sym
bols will

o c c u r .

*54

Clearly, if the choice of a symbol, i, depends in
part on what preceding symbol, j, has been chosen, then in
general, less "new information" is conveyed by the selection

^2Ibid.. pp. 19-20.
George A Miller, "Speech and Language," Handbook
of Experimental Psychology. Ed. 3. S. Stephens (Mew York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1951)> XXI, p, 792.
^For the purposes of this paper, Miller's formula
has been somewhat modified in order to move a constant pre
ceding the summation, but corrected in stating the logarith
mic base two.

2?

of i than if that selection had been made independently
of j.

Of course, such inter-symbol influence may extend

much farther back than to just the one symbol immediately
prior to the selection of it
symbols.

to two, four, or 100 preceding

Then:

By reducing the range of choice, the context gives
us information about what the next item is going to be.
Thus, when the next word occurs, some of the information
it conveys is identical with information we have already
received from the context. This repeated information is
called "redundancy."??
Although there is a good deal more to the theory
than has been given here, the presentation of but one more
aspect of the theory will be sufficient for the purposes of
this section.

This aspect is the concept of "channel capa

city."
A number of

i n v e s t i g a t o r s ^

»57,5& have shown that

any physical communication channel has a finite capacity
for transmitting information from a discrete

s o u r c e . 59

55George A, Miller, "What is Information Measure

ment?" American Psychologist. £(1953)> p. S.
5%. Kupfmuller, !,Uber insehwiengvorgange in Wellenfiltern?" Blektrlsche Aaohrichtentechnik. 1 (1924), p. 141
(cited in Garner, p. 9*H
5?Kyquist.

^^Hartley.

59fhe discrete source is one which generates messages
by temporally ordered sequences of selections from a finite
set of possible choices. It is distinguished from the "con
tinuous" source, which makes but one selection from a con
tinuum of elements. The continuous source has been of little
importance in the behavioral sciences. Luce, p. 16.

2a

In his formulations, however, Shannon went much further
j

than this, principally in connection with his ”fundamental
theorems.” Weaver explains,
This theorem relates to a communication channel which
has a capacity of C bits per second, accepting signals
from a source of entropy (or information) of H bits per
second* The theorem states that by devising proper
coding procedures for the transmitter it is possible to
transmit symbols over the channel at an average rate
which is nearly C/H, but which, no matter how clever
the coding, can never be made to exceed C/H.60
With respect to the noisy channel, an equally powerful
theorem can be stated.

In these cases the channel capacity

is defined to be the difference between the total uncertainty
reaching the destination and the uncertainty introduced by
noise (i.e., the maximum rate at which "useful” Information
can be transmitted).

Again, Weaver explains the theorem:

Suppose that a noisy channel has . . . a capacity C,
suppose it is accepting from an information source
characterized by an entropy of H(x) bits per second,
the entropy of the received signals being H(y) bits
per second. If the channel capacity C is equal to or
larger than H(x), then by devising appropriate coding
systems, the output of the source can be transmitted
over the channel with as little error as one pleases.
However small a frequency of error you specify, there is
a code which meets the demand. But if the channel
capacity G is less than H(x ), the entropy of the source
from which it accepts messages, then it Is impossible
to devise codes which reduce the error frequency as low
as one may please.
However clever one is with the coding process, it
will always be true that after the signal is received
there remains some undesirable (noise) uncertainty about
what the message was; and this undesirable uncertainty—

^Shannon and Weaver, p. 17
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this equivocation— will always be equal to or greater
than H(x) - C. Furthermore, there is always at least
one code which is capable of reducing this undesirable
uncertainty, concerning the message, down to a value
which exceeds H(x) - C by an arbitrarily small amount.61
This completes the treatment of the mathematics of
information theory in this

s e c t i o n . 6 2

The Assumptions of Shannon*s Theory
Underlying Shannon’s "mathematical theory of communi
cation" is a set of basic assumptions from which the theorems
are derived.63

As Cherry points out, however,

the theory was first set up to describe the properties
of a communication source, channel and receiver, as
exampled, say, by a teleprinter channel, such a system
is not precisely analogous to a human operator with his
sense-stirauli and overt responses.64
In view of the disparity between applications to electrical
communication systems with which the theory was originally
intended to deal, and the applications of the theory wherein
the human operator {"subject") is considered as a communica
tion channel, it will be helpful to list the basic assumptions

61Ibid.. pp. 21-22.
6^The mathematically-inclined reader will find the
treatment here somewhat simple and incomplete. A number of
rigorous formalizations of the theory have been presented,
however, which are readily available, for example: Luce;
A. I. Kuchin, Mathematical Foundations of Information Theory,
trans. it. A. Silverman and H. C. Friedman {New York: Dover,
1957).
^Pierce, p. 9.
64cherry, "On the Validity . . •

p. 177.
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of Shannon’s theory and later point to some possible prob
lems which might arise when the human operator is considered
as a communication channel*
The assumptions underlying information theory as it
relates to the physical communication system envisioned by
Shannon are stated by Cherry*
1* The theory is expressed entirely in the (meta-)
language of an external observer, not in that of one of
the participants. . . . We observe a communication
channel only by setting up another— the "Observation
Channel.n°5
Shannon is also explicit in concerning this assump
tion:

"We consider a communication system and an observer

(or auxiliary device) who can see both what is sent and what
is recovered (with errors due to noise)."66 Figure & in
Shannon’s book as well as Cherry’s illustration (Figure 2
below) emphasize the importance of this "Observation Channel."
This assumption is important to behavioral researchers,
since, as Cherry points out,
In physical, including psychological, experiments,
observations are made and reported upon; and the nature
of the reports, the theory set up, will depend upon
whether the observer is completely outside the phenome
non he observes, or whether he himself is part of it.
. . . In many laboratory experiments the observer may
disturb the phenomenon by his very observations; or he
may need to make changes, or alter some situation, before
the phenomenon comes to light. But the experiments

65lbld. t

p.

m .

^Shannon and Weaver, p. 6$, emphasis added.

31

upon "communication" are particularly prone to disturb
ance by the observer as when, for instance, this observer
is one of the communicants.6/
2, Shannon^ theory is a statistical one; that is,
it concerns only average, microscopic, properties of a
system, not specific momentary properties.

Figure 2
Channel,
or medium

Source

possible
sent
messages

Obs erver's
channel
or meta
channel

Receiver
apparatus

Noise

External
observer

Adapted from Cherry, p. 177.
Some elaboration of this assumption is provided by
Luce, who says,
The information model for noisy systems is concerned
with limiting behavior— with infinitely long messages
and delays. Subjects invariably deal with finite mes
sages and introduce comparatively short delays. It does
not immediately follow that the model gives bad approxi
mations for such cases, but it does suggest that caution
is needed.69
Chronbach also indicates that the Shannon measure is not

6?Cherry, "On the Validity, .
6aIbid., p. 17S

pp. 176-177,

6^Luce, p. 52,
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designed for the analysis of finite sequences of behavior,
and observes that "the probability of a correct guess , . •
is described by the Shannon measure only in the limit.1170
3, From long series of past observations it is as
sumed that the external observer has made good estimates
of the probabilities (frequencies) of occurrence of the
various transmitted message signals x» received signals
Xt and interfering noise. Further, it is assumed that
the noise source(s) can be identified ("singled out")
and their statistical properties specified by the ob
server. or, in certain simple cases, that noise is ab
sent .7 j
In many situations, it is possible for the external
observer to determine the statistical properties of the
source prior to the experiment, but it may occasionally hap
pen that the experimenter is unable to do this.

The assump

tion, however, requires the external observer to know the
statistical properties of both the source and the receiver,
and with a good deal of accuracy.

It follows, of course, that

only the external observer can be capable of any complete
description of the statistics of the system.
The identification of the noise sources may pose an
extremely difficult problem in many experimental situations,
particularly those in which the human being is considered a
communication channel.

It should be noted that the assumption

does not require that any particular bodily organ be identified

70Chronbach, p, 72.
7^Cherry, "On the Validity. , .

p. 17#-#
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as the source of noise, or that any name at all be attached
to that source.

Nevertheless, it does require that the

source(s) of noise be statistically identified and separated
with respect to their effects on the communication system.
4. It is assumed that, a priori, the two communi
cants operate with an agreed set of message signs, or
alphabet, having certain definite frequencies of occur
rence. It is assumed that these frequencies remain un
changed with the passage of time; that is, that the
statistics of the situation are stationary,72
Luce again further emphasized the situation:
The model supposes that the destination is aware of
and uses a good deal of the available statistical in
formation about the source and the noise. In many
actual and experimental situations, subjects have only
the crudest knowledge of these probabilities, and even
when they do know them, there is no a priori certainty
that they will use this information.
The fifth and last basic assumption of information
theory Cherry states as follows:
5. It is assumed that this alphabet of signs x-j,
x2,
Xn (signals, ensemble of messages, coding
system) remains unchanged.74
Here again, the external observer may find difficul
ties.

Although it is usually possible to specify at the

beginning of an experiment which symbols are to be employed,
there is no guarantee that the operators will continue to
use the same ensemble throughout the experiment.

That is,

it may prove convenient (from a point of view which would

72Ibid., p. 173.

73luce, p. 52 ,

7i*Cherry, n0n the Validity * , , ,l? p. 173
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require, for the sake of ”simplicity,” that some symbols
be omitted from consideration in order to reduce probabil
ity computations) to substantially reduce the number of
symbols which are thought of as nprobable.” Or, it is also
conceivable that subjects may become confused, and add more
symbols to the experimental ensemble*

Cherry, moreover,

alludes to further problems with respect to this assumption
when the concept of ”continuous information” is introduced.
This concept, he says, is an ”unreality.”75>76
This statement of the assumptions of information
theory ends the discussion of the theory per se which has
been dealt with in the present chapter.

The next ehapter

will undertake an examination of the various applications
of information theory in communication research.

Ibid*. p, tgy.
7^For a concise discussion of this point* which is
beyond the scope of this paper, see pp. 137-133 of Cherry’s
article.

CHAPTER III
APPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION THEORY
IN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
An examination of the literature in the behavioral
sciences which employs information theory techniques as a
method of data analysis or as a model for experimental re
search reveals four pertinent features about those applica
tions :
1. Few of the applications are to problems tradi
tionally classed as communication; this was predicted
by Miller and Frick in their 1949 paper.'
2. The applications do not generally use the funda
mental theorem relating channel capacity, the statisti
cal structure of the source, and the transmission
rate. . . .
3. The theory has not really generated new problems
to be studied in psychology* Rather it has caused re
examination and reformulation of old problems.* In some
cases . . . it has permitted several apparently dispar
ate effects to be included within a single theoretical
^Miller and Frick, p. 324.
2Some investigators do not feel that this is the case.
Referring to a technique for measuring the accuracy of stim
ulus identification based on information theory suggested by
Garner and Hake ("The Amount of Information in Absolute Judge
ments," Psychological Review, 5$ /795J7 t 446-459, Attneave
says:
The Garner-Hake method opened a whole new area of ex
perimentation and further provided the basis for McGill’s
development of a method of multivariate analysis which
is the informational analogue of analysis of variance
components. (Fred Attneave, Applications of Information
Theory to Psychology /lew York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1 9 5 :2 7 7

p

.
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framework. The fact that old problems are being treated
does not, unfortunately, mean that new data are not
needed. A published experiment rarely fulfills the ex
act conditions another worker would like. More import
ant, the isolation of sequential dependencies requires a
new analysis of the raw data, and it is very rare indeed
to find extensive publications of raw data.
4.
Like a new mistress, information theory seemed
at first elusive and full of promise. She was the justi
fication for both intensity and irresponsibility: a
thing of perfection requiring little more than some ex
perimentation to bear fruit. With the passing years, a
more '’mature’1 if less exciting relationship has developed.2
These four generalizations are suggestive of the need
for a scheme of classification of informational analyses.
While a number of such systems have been used by various in
vestigators ,4- »6 it shall be convenient for the purposes of
this paper to employ a division suggested as a possibility by
R, D. Luce.?>^ The divisions are based on the fact that
information theory has introduced methods for dealing with

3Luce, pp. 51-52.

^Garner.

5Binder and Violin, pp. 29-54.

^Pierce,

?Luce, p. 53.
^In fact, a number of other factors enter into this
choice of divisions. It is often convenient for psycholo
gists to classify the uses of informational models on the
basis of the mathematical level of the analysis (i.e., univariare, bivariare, multivariare, etc.). Binder and Violin,
however, point out a number of errors in the work of other
researchers resulting from the misuse of such models. Rather
than become involved in a discussion of these mathematical
models, the scheme adopted is based on the type of problem
to which the analysis is applied. For a penetrating discus
sion of five informational models, and some of the problems
in other research, see Binder and Violin.
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three central concepts:
1* Sequential dependencies,

These studies would

Include applications which use information theory to deal
with sequential data, or with problems of redundancy.

These

types of applications are examined in the first section of
this chapter.
2.

Noise,

Applications which use the theorems for

noisy communication to cope with problems where stimulus
and response are not perfectly correlated fall into this
category.
3.

These are discussed in the second section,
Capacity and transmission.

Studies which employ

the central theorems of information theory concerning rates
of transmission and capacity are considered in the third
section.
Sequential Dependencies
Probably the most widely known of all of the types
of applications of information theory are those in the area
of sequential dependencies.

This type of research is based

on the calculation of information and redundancy in a se
quence of symbols.
In the last chapter (see p. 27), the concept of re
dundancy in a sequence of symbols was briefly discussed.
This aspect of information theory forms the basis for the
analysis of sequential dependencies.
the basic issue, Attneave says:

To further clarify

3B

A fundamental idea in information theory is that of
"kke stochastic process. A stochastic process is any
system which gives rise to a sequence of symbols to
which probability laws apply. It may be extremely sim
ple, like a tossed coin, . . . or extremely complex, as
in the case of a sequence of musical notes written by a
composer, or a sequence of letters making up English
text. A stochastic process is said to be ergodic if the
probability laws which characterize it remain constant
for all parts of the sequence* Ergodieity, or at least
an approximation thereto, is usually a necessary condi
tion for the application of information measures to a
sequence. , . .
A stochastic process is characterized by some degree
of redundancy between 0 percent and 100 percent, At the
zero-redundancy extreme, all the symbols generated have
equal probability of occurrence, and nothing that we may
know about the history of the sequence makes the next
symbol any more predictable. At the opposite extreme,
at 100 percent redundancy, symbols are generated in an
altogether lawful and regular sequence, such that one
can predict with complete certainty what the next symbol
will be. . . * The most interesting sequences fail some
where between these two extremes. , . .9
One of the first of the studies employing the concept
of sequential dependencies was conducted by Shannon.^® He
demonstrated a series of stochastic process generating "arti
ficial languages" with probability laws taken from the Eng
lish language.

As the order of the probability laws taken

from English is increased, the series of symbols thereby
generated rapidly approaches spoken and written English.
Shannon gives the following illustrations?
1•

2ero-order approximation to English* A process

^Attneave, pp. 13-14.
^Shannon and Weaver, pp. 43-44.

selecting symbols (letters) from the English alphabet (of
26 letters and one space) completely at random might gener
ate a sequence such as:
IFOML RIXXKHRJFFJUJ
ZPAAMKBZAACIS ZIJQD.

ZLFWCFWKCYJ FFJEVVKC0Q3GHYD

Such a sequence makes no sense at all to speakers of
English*
2*

First-order approximation* In this ease, the

selections are still independent, but with the frequencies
of English text.

That is, Shannon generated a sequence

of letters based on their probabilities of occurrence in
English texts.

His example is as follows:

GCRO HLI RGWR NMIELWIS EU LL HBSESEHYA TH EEI
ALHENHTTPA C0BTTYA HAH BRL.

As in the case of the zero-order approximation, this
is not meaningful to English users.
3.

Second-order approximation. In this case, Shan

non constructed the sequence based on the probabilities that
anv two symbols (called ’’digrams” ) will occur.^

That is,

given one letter, Shannon determined, on a probabilistic

^ ’’Shannon constructed this sequence, and those of
higher order, by an ingenious short-cut technique. He be
gan by selecting at random a letter from a book, and record
ing it. Opening the book at another page, he read until
this letter occurred, and recorded the succeeding one. He
then searched for the second letter on another page, and
recorded the one succeeding it, and so on.” Attneave, p. 16.
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basis, what the next letter was.

The sequence generated

was:
ON IE ANTSOUTHINYS ARE T INGTORE ST BE 3 DEAMX
ACHIN D IL0NA3IVE TUCGCWE AT TEASONAME FU30 TIZIN
ANDX TOBI SEAGE CTI3BE.
At this point, the emergence of some familiarity can
be seen.

For example, the English words T*on,n "are," "be,”

"at,” and "Andy” all occur in the sequence.
4.

Third-order approximation. In generating this

sequence, Shannon used the same method as above, except that
each pair of letters just recorded was used in determining
the next one.

The structures are called "trigrams,” and the

example Shannon gives is:
IN HO 1ST LAT WHEY CRATICE FROURE BIRS GROCID
P0NDEH0ME OF BEMOKSTRURES OF THE REPTACIN IS
REGOACTIONA OF CRE.
While none of the sequences are English, it can be
seen that the last is a better "approximation to English”
than the preceding ones; i.e., it is "more" English than
the rest.
5.

First-order word approximation. At this point

Shannon suggests that a jump to word approximations might
be easier and better than to continue with tetragtam,
. . * , N-gram letter approximations.

For the first-order

word approximation words were chosen independently with
their appropriate frequencies:
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REPRESENTING AND SPEEDILY IS AN GOOD APT OR COME
GAR DIFFERENT NATURAL HERE HE THE A IN COME THE TO OF
TO EXPERT GRAY COME TO FURNISHES THE LINE MESSAGE
HAD BE THESE. '
6.

Second-order word approximation. Digram frequen

cies for words were used in constructing the following:
THE HEAD AND IN FRONTAL ATTACK ON AN ENGLISH WRITER
THAT THE CHARACTER OF THIS POINT IS THEREFORE ANOTHER
METHOD FOR THE LETTERS THAT THE TIME OF WHO EVER TOLD
THE PROBLEM FOR AN UNEXPECTED.
With respect to these approximations Attneave ob
serves ,
The progression of these samples toward English is
striking* Under (4 ) we find groups of letters which
obviously could be words "grocid pondenome" is almost
worthy of Lewis Carroll), and in (6) the discourse ap
proaches a sort of schizoid plausibility.12
Somewhat capriciously, Pierce adds:
To me, deamy has a pleasant sound; I would take
nit’s a deamy idea” in a complimentary sense. On the
other hand, I*d hate to be denounced as ilonasive. I
would not like to be called groeid. , , , Pondenome.
whatever it may be, is at least dignified. . . .
I find jj&T disquieting. I feel that the English
writer is in mortal peril, yet I cannot come to his aid
because the latter part of the message is garbled.'3
Some of the first applications of information theory
were to the problem of the calculation of the redundancy of
written English,

While the number of possible combinations

^Attneave, p. 17*
13Pierce, pe 262.
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of letter sequences in English precludes the possibility of
direct measurement of redundancy of English beyond very low**
order dependencies,^ several indirect techniques for the
estimation of redundancy have been developed.

As Garner

notes, however:
All of the indirect techniques have used the assump
tion, in some form, that intelligent adults can and do
use the statistical properties of printed English, and
that, therefore, performance measure can be used to es
timate the redundancy of languages.^5 ,1o

In principle all we need to do is calculate
p (.i/ii,i?, . . . , jLjj) t^or all the letters
and for all
N-tuples of letters and blanks which might precede. Prom
this we could compute
^
(bj.».i)loggP(j/bi),
where b^ denotes a typical block of M-1 successive let
ters preceding j. Were these
known, then we could
estimate the entropy of the sample to any desired accur
acy using the fact that H **
~I.
difficulty becomes apparent when we realize that
a 27 letter alphabet yields 27 ^ possible 1 -grams. Of
course, many of these are impossible in English, but
even were we to assume that, say, only one percent were
possible, there would still be 1,966 cases to be exam
ined with M * 3 , and 53,144 for 1 - 4 .
Nonetheless,
can be computed for very small values
of K, and Shannon"”reports that F-j « 4.14 bits/letter,
^2 ** 3*56 bits/letter, ^3 “ 3«3 bits letter." Luce.,
pp. 53-54.
^Garner, p. 22 0 .
^This assumption has been verified for both letters
(M.S. Kaysner, M.E. Tresselt, S. Adler, and K.A. Schoenberg,
"Correlations Between Subjects Generated Letter Frequencies
and Observed Frequencies in English," Psvchonomic Science. 1

Shannon used two methods In his first estimation of
redundancy of English,

In the first of these he generated

approximations to English based on published tables, and
calculated the redundancy*

The second method was to randomly

delete certain percentages of the letters in a written pass
age, and then ask subjects to reconstruct the original message.
On the basis of these two studies, Shannon estimated the re
dundancy of English at about 50 per cent and the entropy at
2.3 bits per letter.^
Shannon also developed a different sort of procedure
for estimating the upper and lower bounds of redundancy.
Again, he used passages of English as material, but his
subjects were asked to guess each successive letter.

In

guessing the first letter of the sentence, the subject
could use only his knowledge of the probabilities of occur
rence of the letters of the English alphabet, but as he con
tinued to guess the succeeding letters, the order of prob
ability increased accordingly.

He continued guessing on

each letter until he was correct.

Shannon then recorded

the number of guesses required to get each letter in the

ZT9647 , 295-296) and words (Eoy Omer Freedle, ”Response Bias
in a Modified Shannon Guessing Game ,** Proceedings of the
73rd Annual Convention of the American 'Psychological Associa
tion. j % 5'J. 11—12), although in the latter case it was stipu
lated that at least four words should precede each guess.
^Claude E. Shannon, 11Prediction and Entropy of Prin
ted English,” Bell System Technical Journal, 30 (1951)»
5O—64#
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passage correct*

A short sample is shown below, when the

first line is the original text and the second line is the
number of guesses required for each letter:
THERE IS MO R EV ERSE OH A MOTORCYCLE A FRIEND
1115112112111511711121321227111141111131^61311

Shannon gives what is called the "identical twin assump
tion j^8 that is, that if the subject had an "identical twin"
who would guess the letters in exactly the same manner as
the subject himself, the number of guesses could be used as
a code, and by transmitting the number of guesses required
to correctly ascertain each letter, the identical twin could
reconstruct the original message.

As Garner then states:

Such a procedure clearly leads to a lower bound for
redundancy, since the distribution of correct guesses
can become more restricted only if there is in fact more
consistency to the language itself* If the guesser
fully uses all of the properties of the language, his
distribution of correct guesses will be limited by the
redundancy of the language itself. If he does not use
all of the redundancy available, his distribution of
guesses may be greater but cannot be smaller, except
by pure luck. In other words, the distribution of
guesses is limited by the redundancy of the language*
Even if the subject uses all of the redundancy in the
language this procedure still gives a lower-bound esti
mate because it takes into account only the order of
guessing, not the probability of each letter in the
language itself.1 9 ,2 0
^Garner, p. 221,
19Ibid.
2^Attneave points out that n . . . the loose-jointedness of this transformation is attributable to the fact that
even a hypothetically ideal subject, in guessing at a partic
ular letter, does not reveal in his guesses . . . any exact
distribution of probabilities for the next letter, but only
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By a mathematical argument which will not be recapitulated
here, Shannon also found a lower bound for redundancy.2^
From this and other data, Attneave concludes,
It appears that in a long passage of English text,
, . . the average amount of new information contributed
by a letter must settle down to something like one bit,
or possibly less. This is in direct contrast to the
log 27 ® 4.76 bits which each letter would contain if
all the symbols were equally likely and no sequential
dependencies existed. Thus a conservative estimate of
the redundancy of English is about 75 percent.22
An alternative method for finding an upper bound for
the entropy of letters in a sequence, which utilised a new
informational statistic (called the ncoefficient of constraint")

the order of certain of these probabilities." (Attneave,
p. 3jn
Further, Garner notes three factors which enter into
the adequacy of this technique: (1)" . , . the subject
must be skilled in his knowledge and use of the statistical
properties of the language for the lower bound estimate to
be near the true value of redundancy." (2) " . . . it is
necessary to ensure that the subject have no prior knowl
edge of the language samples being used," (3) "While it is
not necessary that the subjects be sampled, it is essential
that the language be sampled," (Garner, pp. 221-222),
2^The bounds Shannon obtained for the Nth order
entropy, F^,- were given as
i«2? ~ H
N
1=27 N
1
(£i - Pi+1 )i log i - Fk < 13 Pi log*l where
Pi stands for the proportion of times 1 guesses are re
quired to identify the Nth letter of a passage. A more com
plete mathematical treatment may be found in Luce, pp. 57-$.
22Attneave, pp. 33-35.
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was devised by Newman and Gerstman.23

Again, the mathemati

cal derivation of their measure will be omittedj2^ however,
their results, based on entirely objective observations,2^
gave a value of 4*00 bits for the uncertainty of single let
ter distributions, and 2.12 bits for the sum of contingent
uncertainties up to 11 letters, thus placing the relative
redundancy on the basis of the contingency terms at 52 per
cent.
Noise
The second category of applications of information
theory to communication research are those concerned with
noise.

In theory, this includes all of those situations in

which the ’’stimulus and response are not perfectly correla
ted, e.g., where there are errors of some type.”2? The most
obvious of such applications, it seems, would be those con
cerning speech intelligibility under noisy conditions.

It

is somewhat surprising, then, that almost no studies have

23e . B. Newman and L. S. Gerstman, ”A New Method for
Analyzing Printed English,” Journal of Experimental Psych
ology. 44 (1952), 114-125.
2Huce points out that the formulations are based on
an assumption as yet unproved, and notes that Newman and
Gerstman themselves state that there are limiting cases in
which the assumption has been shown not to apply. Luce,
pp. 59-60.
^3Attneave, p. 37.
2?Luce, p. 53.

^Garner, p. 232.
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dealt directly with speech intelligibility in interpersonal
communication under noisy conditions and in which noise is
an independent variable with analysis in terms of informa
tion transmission.

Garner suggests that this might be due

in part to the problem of word selection, since it is impos
sible to show that the results obtained are independent of
language sampling factors.^

Only synthetical data are

available concerning the transmission of information in
noise, based primarily on the work of Miller, Heise, and
Lichten.2^ Garner interprets this evidence as follows:
At T&J low S/N /signal-to-noise7 ratio, there is
no information transmission. . . . As the S/N ratio is
increased, information transmission also increases.
. . . The data presented here are skimpy for the pur
pose, but they strongly suggest that there is an asymp
totic value for each S/N level; that is, for each S/N
ratio we can specify a channel capacity— a result that
seems eminently reasonable# Thus we should be able to
specify the effects of noise by stating a single number
which is the channel capacity for that noise level,30
Eeplotting the Miller, Heise, and Lichten data with the
signal-to-noise ratio on the abscissa (rather than the un
certainty of the test vocabulary), Garner finds that
it is not at all unreasonable to draw a single function
to represent all of the data— a function which specifies

2®Garner, p. 79,
A, Miller, G, A. Heise, and W. Lichten, ’’The
Intelligibility of Speech as a Function of the Context of
the Test Materials,” Journal of Experimental Psychology,
41 (1951), 329-335.
■^Garner, p.

.
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a single value of (maximum) information transmission as
a function of noise level* Furthermore, the intercept
of the function on the abcissa allows us to state the
S/N ratio below which no information transmission can
be obtained— in this case at -16 db.31
And extrapolating the data to 10 bits of information trans
mission, "the equivalent S/N ratio is +20 db,— suggesting
that perfect intelligibility occurs at that level."32,33
In obtaining these estimates, however, Garner makes two
critical assumptions.

First, it was assumed that the re

sponse uncertainty would be the same as the stimulus uncer
tainty, and second, that the percent of correct identifica
tions is the largest single category of responses, and that
all of the errors are then randomly distributed among the
other possible alternatives.34,35 While the first of these
seems reasonable, the second might well be questioned.

But

if the first assumption is incorrect, the effect would be
that the information transmission estimate would be too

31 Ibid.

32xbid*, p. S3.

33The upper limit of 10 bits represents an asymtotic
level, not a discrete break in the function*
3^Garner, p. BO,
35$y way 0f illustration, if it is supposed that
there are four stimulus categories, a response uncertainty
of 2,0 bits was assumed* And if, for a given condition, 40
per cent of the words were correctly identified, it was
assumed the distribution of responses was 40,20,20, and 20,
giving a conditional uncertainty of 1.92 bits. Subtracting
this from the response uncertainty gave an estimated infor
mation transmission of 0.0B bit. Garner, p. BO,
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high,3^ but as Garner points out, ”it would take consider
able error of this sort to change the conclusion that infor
mation transmission increases with an increase in size of
test vocabulary.”37

if the second assumption were incorrect,

however, the effect would be opposite that of the first,
since the assumption maximizes the computed conditional uncer
tainty, thus minimizing the estimated information transmis
sion.3^

Errors due to the two assumptions should then tend

to cancel.
A more frequently employed application of information
theory in the category of noise are those studies in reaction
time.

As stated in Chapter I, however, these studies do not

fall into what has been traditionally referred to as "commu
nication,” and hence shall not be dealt with in this paper*39
Capacity and Transmission
Some of the most interesting applications of informa
tion theory are those in which the theorems are used to

3%his is so since in assuming that response uncer
tainty is the same as stimulus uncertainty, a maximum pos
sible value is assumed, since any unequal distribution of
responses can only lower the value. Garner, p. $1.
37Garner, pp. 81-82.

3^ibid., p. 81.

39several good reviews of informational analyses in
reaction time studies are already in existence. See, for
example, Peter D, Bricker, "Information Measurement and Re
action Time: A Review,” Information Theory in Psychology,
ed. Henery Quaselor (Glencoe 111.: The Free’Press, 1955}*
pp. 350-359.

determine rates of transmission and capacity*

Perhaps the

most widely known of these applications have been based on
the assumption that the human being ean be considered as a
communication channel.

Cherry says:

"Comparison between

a human operator and a communication channel is today com
monplace j the stimuli represent ’in-put signals’ applied to
his sense-organs, while his overt responses represent ’out
put signals’; the human operator represents the ’transdu
cer,’”^

As a number of investigators have pointed out,

however, this position is not altogether adequate for all
situations,41*42 and Hake has further stated that a measure
of transmitted information is meaningless unless an opera
tional definition of each experimental context is also sup
plied,^

This issue will be taken up in the "Conclusions”

in more detail; a recount of some of the major ideas is given
here to illustrate two common approaches taken by researchers.
According to Luce:
Two procedures to estimate the capacity seem possible.
First estimate the channel capacity from whatever
physical, physiological, and psychological facts that
are known to be relevant to the type of transmission
being employed. Second, by varying certain variables
and employing diverse coding schemes, find the maximum
amount of information that a person can be caused to
handle* This, by the fundamental theorem of information
theory, affords a lower bound on the capacity.44
40cherry, "On the Validity • . . ," p. 17$,
41Masono Toda, "Information-Receiving Behavior of
Man,” Psychological Review, 63 (1956), 204-212,
^Chronbach.
44x,uce, p. 71,

43cherry, "On the Validity . . . ," p. 1
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Using the first procedure to obtain an upper bound of
the channel capacity of human being has been somewhat prob
lematic in a number of respects.

Luce suggests that

possibly part of the difficulty in obtaining a satisfac
tory estimate by the first procedure is the lack of an
adequate model for what happens functionally within a per
son when he is processing information. Thus, Independent
measurements on most of the ”channel"— which is surely
not homogeneous in its properties— cannot be had. As a
result, the estimates which have been made are in a
sense only concerned with the peripheral aspects of the
channel.45
The first method has resulted in upper bounds of approximately
10,000 bits per second, but it is thought that this estimate
is considerably higher than the actual capacity,4^ particu
larly in view of the estimate of the lower bound based on
the second procedure.
On the basis of a phonetic analysis of spoken lang
uage assuming that a vocabulary of 5,000 words is distribu
ted equi-probably and that these words are spoken at 1.5
words per second, the information transmission rate is 1#
bits per second
This work has thus far reviewed the historical and
mathematical backgrounds of information theory, stated the
assumptions of the theory, and briefly discussed previous
research in the three major areas of applications of

45ibid.
47ibid.

46Ibid.
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information theory in communication research.
Other Studies
This paper would he incomplete without some reference
to a considerable number of studies purporting to use infor
mation theory and informational concepts but which cannot be
reasonably said to fall into the areas of application hereto
fore discussed.

The principle reason for this writer’s in

ability to classify such studies into any of those three
areas is that many employ bits and pieces of the mathematics
of information theory, apparently arbitrarily selected with
out reference to the communication model which information
theory presupposes.

Moreover, a large portion of the studies

to be discussed here have little or nothing to do with any
part of information theory beyond the attachment of the
label in the title.
Information theorists have been lamenting such appli
cations since they first appeared, but the number of them
seems to have increased rather than decreased.

It is with

respect to these types of applications that Luce has been
previously quoted:
Like a new mistress, information theory seemed at
first elusive and full of promise. She was the justifi
cation for both intensity and irresponsibility: a thing
of perfection requiring little more than some experi
mentation to bear fruit,A®
^Luee, pp. 51-52,
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Unfortunately, the more ’’mature" relationship Luce suggests
later developed seems to have materialized in not all re
searchers.

As Weaver and Weaver point out, "It is not dif

ficult to find, either in published reports or in oral dis
cussion, examples of statements that imply, and sometimes
say, that Shannonfs formula can be used to measure the amount
of meaning in a message, either written or spoken."^

Their

report very convincingly argues the understatement that "if
computed only on the probability of occurrence of single
words in a stochastic process, the bit of information has
less than a one-to-one correspondence with meaning.”
Similarly, other areas of application of information
theory have come under criticism of a similar sort.

Pierce

says :
I have read a good deal more about information theory
and psychology than I can or care to remember, Much of
it was a mere association of new terms with old and
vague ideas. Presumably the hope was that a stirring
in of new terras would clarify the old ideas by a sort
of sympathetic magic.51
For the most part, such applications have only served to
confuse and complicate matters, and little of importance
has resulted from them.

^Carl h . Weaver and Garry L. Weaver, "Speech Commu
nication and Information Theory," p. 1. University of Mary
land, Missile System Analysis Group, Applied Physics Lab.
(Mimeographed.)
5°Ibid., p. 2$.

51Pierce, p. 229*
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Elsewhere, information theory has been connected with
biology,^ music,53 fiction writing,5^ and even the visual
arts.55 While many of these applications are very interest
ing, and often informative, their connection to information
theory per se is at best questionable.

In the next chapter

two of such speculative studies in the area of speech com
munication shall be analyzed in the same manner as will
others in the three areas already discussed.

The analyses,

it is hoped, will illustrate the tenuous nature of this sort
of research.

5^Henery Quastler (ed,), Essays on the Use of Infor
Theory in Biology (Urbana , 111.: University of Illi
nois Press, 1953).
53r . c . Pinkerton, "Information Theory and Melody,"
Scientific American. 194 (1956), 77-66.

mation

54pierce, pp. 261-64.

55ibid. , pp. 264 -6 7 .

CHAPTER I?
ANALYSES OF STUDIES IN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
The purpose of the present chapter is to examine
in detail several common types of applications of infor
mation theory with respect to the basic assumptions of
the formal theory as stated in Chapter II.

These models

shall be examined both in general terms and as specific
approaches in specific experiments.

The analyses will

show whether the models and studies have met the assump
tions of the theory, and if they have, by what experi
mental procedures; or if not, what procedures were not
consistent with the assumptions.

The analyses seek to

show only whether the experimental procedures are consis
tent with the assumptions of information theory; it should
be very clear that no attempt shall be made to judge the
validity of the results or the usefulness of the models
for research purposes.
Sequential Dependencies
The majority of the studies in communication research
which emplqy information theory have concentrated on se
quential dependencies and redundancy*

Two basic approaches
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emerge in this category.^
The first of these are those which follow the tech
niques and approach of Miller and Selfridge, who explored
the effects of language redundancy on learning#2
It occurred to them that the fact that ’’meaningful”
material is more easily remembered than ’’nonsense” material
might be attributable to sequential associations of the
symbols, and not ”meaningfulness” per se.

That is, they

thought that the greater redundancy (i.e., lower information
content of ’’meaningful” material)^ might contribute to the
ease of learning.

Their stimulus material was statistical

%hil@ it should not be said that the two approaches
here considered are the only ways in which information theory
has been employed, the large majority of applications would
fall into one of the models mentioned here. For a good
treatment of somewhat more specific categorizations, see
Luce, "The Theory of Selective Information , . . ,” chps,
7-13.
2 G. A. Miller and Jennifer A. Selfridge, ”Verbal
Context and the Recall of Meaningful Material,” American
Journal of Psychology# 63 (1950), 176-185.

•^While this experiment may not fall into the class
which has thus far been termed a ’’communication" study, it
is included here since, besides being one of the first exper
imental applications of information theory, techniques were
developed during the course of the experiment which have be
come very well known and commonly used. Consideration, then,
for purposes of orientation and illustration, is provided.
The remainder of the studies deal more specifically with
communication research,
^It would
with redundancy,
dundant material
neave, p. 19 and

be erroneous to equate ”meaningfulness"
since it is quite possible that highly re
may be "nonsensical," or vice versa, AttGarner, p. 275.
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approximations of English, as exampled in Chapter III.

In

constructing the approximations, however, they found that
Shannon’s method was too laborious and time consuming to be
used in obtaining higher order approximations, and devised
a new technique.

To construct an Nth order approximation,

they showed a sequence of N-1 words to a person who was in
structed to use this sequence in a sentence.

Then

the word he used directly after the sequence would be
added, the first word of the sequence would be dropped,
and the new (but overlapping) sequence would be pre
sented to the next person, . . .5
Zero, first, second, third, fourth, and fifth, and seventh
order approximations to English were constructed in this
manner, and samples of English text were also used.

Each

order of approximation was represented by lists 1 0 , 2 0 , 3 0 ,
and 50 words in length.

Twenty subjects heard the words

read aloud once, and later attempted to repeat them.

The

per cent of words correctly recalled was then plotted on
the ordinate against the order of approximation.

It was

shown that the greater the degree of contextual constraint,
the easier it was to remember the material.

At about the

fifth order approximation* however, the curve leveled off,
indicating that beyond this order the effect of the associa
tions was negligible.

Discussing the implications of their

55Miller and Selfridge, p. 1&3

5$

findings, Miller and Selfridge add;
The results indicate that meaningful material is
easy to learn, not because it is meaningful per se but
because it preserves the short range associations that
are familiar to the 3s. Nonsense materials that retain
these short range associations are also easy to learn.
By shifting the problem from "meaning” to degree of con
textual constraint the whole area is reopened to experi
mental investigation.®
While their results have been confirmed by van de
Geer^ and Sharp,^ both Garner^ and Attneave^ argue that
their conclusion may have gone too far, since a subsequent
study by Marks and Jack^ found that if the subjects were
scored on memory span,
although the average span of words correctly recalled
increased steadily with the order of approximation to
English, the greatest increase . . . occurred between
the fifth-order approximation and English text. Marks
and Jack conclude that meaning does have a facilitating
effect on immediate memory, over and above the reduction

6 Ibid.. p. 104.

^J. P. van de Geer, ,rPsychologische Toepassingen
van de Inforraatie-theorie," Ned. Ti.idschr. Psvchol., 12
(1957), pp. 295-320, 333-357. (Cited in Garner, p. 269.)
^H. C. Sharp, "Effect of Contextual Constraint Upon
Recall of Verbal Passages," American Journal of Psychology.
71 (1958 ), 568-572.
(Cited in Garner," pV 26977 Sharp is
criticized, however, by Binder and Woiin (p. 43) for using
a formula which ignores most of the characteristics of the
Markovian source in computing the amount of information when
the appropriate model is "clearly Markovian."
^Garner, pp. 269-2?0.

^°Attneave, pp. 18-19.

11M. R. Marks and G. Jack, "Verbal Context and Memory
Span for Meaningful Material," American Journal of Psychol
ogy. 65 (1952), pp. 298-300. (Cited in Attneave, p. 18.)
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which it entails.^
Since the primary concern in the present paper, how
ever , is not the specific results of experiments but some
methodological problems encountered in the course of the
utilization of information models, it will be convenient to
turn to Garner's discussion of these

problems.

^3

Examining this study with respect to the assumptions
of information theory, a number of issues emerge.

The first

assumption of information theory (i.e., that the external
observer must express the events in a "meta-language”— he must
be able to describe both ends of the channel) appears to be
easily satisfied.

The observers knew, of course, the stimu

lus words, and recorded the subject’s responses.
The second assumption, that the theory is concerned
only with average, macroscopic properties of a system (and
that therefore the results obtained must be expressed as
averages) is not so simply satisfied.

Only two groups of

ten subjects each were used in the experiment.

While Miller

and Selfridge hold that "a larger number of subjects would
not have reduced the irregularities in the results, for most
of the variability seemed attributable to sampling peculiari
ties in the lists themselves,"^ strictly speaking, such a

^Attneave, pp. 16-19,

^Garner, pp. 273*276.

1Sailer and Selfridge, p. 161.
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small number of subjects could not give valid results in
terms of meeting this assumption*

Cherry says that the

results must be "averaged over many subjects who are within
the language group"^ in order for the assumption to be
met.

Clearly, twenty subjects could not be called a large

number, and since only four presentations of each order of
approximation were given, the assumption cannot be met.
Assumption three states that the external observer
must have mad© estimates of the message signals, received
signals, and the noise.

Since the experimenters knew vir

tually in toto all that was sent and received, the assump
tion is satisfied.
The fourth assumption necessitates that the message
signals and their probabilities are known to the communi
cants, and that they remain unchanged in time.

As noted in

Chapter III (p. 43), experimental evidence has been found
supporting the assumption that users of a language have a
"built-in" knowledge of the statistics of their language,
and that they will use this knowledge in a situation where
it Is required.^

With respect to learning, however, the

1 ^Cherry, "On the . . .," p* 166.

^In some types of experimental situations, subject
may not use this knowledge to their fullest advantage* This
problem is discussed by Harold Hake, "The Perception of Fre
quency of Occurrence and the Development of ’Expectancy* in
Human Experimental Subjects," Information Theory in Psychol
ogy. pp. 257-277*
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satisfaction of this assumption is somewhat questionable*
A number of investigators have noted that in learning situa
tions the conditions of the test do not remain stationary
with time; that is, as the subject learns, his ensemble of
signals changes,*17,16

clearly, such learning took place in

the Miller and Selfridge study, and hence the assumption can
not be said to be satisfied.
Assumption five, which states that the alphabet of
signs remains unchanged, is satisfied for each list and
approximation.
A second method of employing the notions of redundancy
and constraint involves the deletion of certain words from
context, and requiring subjects to replace

t h e m .

^9 a number

of such experiments have been carried out, although only oc
casionally is an informational analysis attempted.

One of

the more interesting of these studies was conducted by Shep
ard.2^* He noted that the rate of production of words in a

^Cherry, M0n the Validity . . ,

p, 179.

^Luee, p. 50 .
^Several experiments of this type have been conduc
ted using letters as the unit deleted. The results of this
type of experiment generally show that the accuracy with
which words can be replaced is much less than that for let
ters. A review of some of these experiments is given in
Garner, pp. 261-6?.
20Roger N. Shepard, "Production of Constrained Asso
ciates and the Informational Uncertainty of the Constraint,"
American Journal of Psychology. 76 (1963), p. 216.
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given category (such as "famous artists") may be dependent
on the number of words which fall into that category, and
further, that the initial rate of production of words in a
large category ("famous people") is greater than that for a
small category ("famous artists").

If the words in a given

category are taken as a source-ensemble, then the uncertainty
of such a category could be computed.

Usually, however, the

category is so large that it is not feasible to determine
the number of words by exhaustive counting*

But

to the extent, however, that the initial rate of listing
is determined by N, that number, and hence the uncer
tainty, could be "estimated from the initial rate. For
example, the degree of statistical constraint exerted
upon a given word by its surrounding context could be
determined simply by (a) deleting the given word from
its context and (b) measuring the initial rate at which
Ss produce guesses as to what the missing word might
t>e. ‘
As he pointed out, however, the alternative words are not
equally likely to be written down by the subjects, since
some members of the categories are more apt to be thought
of first (i.e., some people are more famous than others).
This study attempted to theoretically and experimentally
examine how the rate of production depends on the uncer
tainty when the variation that exists in the probabilities
of the alternative elements is taken into account*
Shepard selected 36 different newspaper passages

21 Ibid,

containing minimum number of proper names and numbers*
One word was then randomly chosen from each of the passages
and these were deleted from the original text material.
Then, for each of the 36 passages, 1, 2, 4, 6 , 10, and 40
words of context from the original material was supplied
along with a blank space where the deleted word appeared in
the text.

Each subject was then presented, in random order

with 13 of the cards (one with only a blank, or 0 -context,
and two for each of the remaining degrees of context).
After explaining the source of the material and the method
of construction, the subjects were directed to list, in
five minutes, all of the words they could think of which
might occur in the blank.

The number of words recorded

during each 1/2 -minute interval was recorded.
To obtain a measure of uncertainty with which the
rate of listing words could be compared, Shepard used a
letter-guessing technique such as that employed by Shannon.

22

The analysis showed that when the average number of

words per subject is cumulatively plotted as a function of
time (i.e., the average rate) for each of the contextual
conditions,
the results are consistent with the notion that the
inclusion of more context further limits the number
22

Shepard’s method differed in some minor respects
from this original one, but is fundamentally the same.

of available alternatives from which the missing word
might be drawn and therefore decreases the rate of list
ing those alternatives.23
Shepard continues by discussing predictions based on two
models, one of which assumes an equtprobable word distri
bution while the other assumes a Zipf-like distribution
and concludes that the Zipf-like distribution is the more
adequate model•
Examining this study with respect to the assumptions
of information theory, somewhat more consistency can be
seen than in the Miller-Selfridge study.

The first assump

tion, that the external observer must be able to describe
both ends of the channel, is clearly met.

The source-

enserabl© (the newspaper messages) were completely known to
him, as well as the subjects’ responses.
The second assumption, that the theory is concerned
only with average, macroscopic properties of a system, is

^Shepard, p. 221 .
24 G. K, Zipf has suggested that when the number of
times a given word is used in a long sample of prose is
plotted against the rank-ordered frequency of occurrence
(decreasing), the result, on logarithmic paper, is a straight
line with slope -1. (G, K. Zipf, Human Behavior and the
Principle of Least Effort /Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley
Pub. Co., Inc., 194^7). In Shepard’s experiment, the re
sults appear to be fairly consistent with Zipf1s hypothesis.
It has been shown, however, that Zipf’s function is not an
adequate description of word-distribution at the extreme
ends of the scale* A modification, based on informational
concepts, has been suggested by Benoit Mandelbrot, "An In
formational Theory of the Statistical Structure of Language,"
Communication Theory, ed. Willis Jackson (London: Butterworths, 1953 ],V^b-5 d2 .
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more clearly satisfied in this study than the last,

A total

of 234 cards were used in a counterbalanced design with two
groups totaling 16 subjects.

While there may be some ques

tion that an adequate number of subjects was employed, that
each of the subjects was asked to guess the deleted word on
16 different cards, and the results were averaged for both
the subjects and the contextual conditions is consistent
with Cherryrs suggestion that even a relatively small number
of subjects could give adequate estimations providing the
results were averaged over a sufficiently large number of
trials.25
To meet the third assumption, that the probabilities
of the signals are known to the observer, it is only neces
sary that the experimenter knew all of the stimulus contexts
and the number of words deleted.

Noise is assumed negligi

ble.
The fourth assumption, that the message signals and
their probabilities are known to the communicants and that
they remain unchanged in time, is dealt with by noting, as
previously, that users of English have a "built-in” knowl
edge of the structure of the language and the probabilities
of occurrence of its elements.

The effects of learning

appear to be irrelevant since it is doubtful that the subjects

^Cherry, "On the Validity , . «

p. 163 .
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would alter their guessing significantly from one deletion
context to another if the contexts are drawn, as they were,
from different sources.

On the other hand, it is difficult

to rule out the effects of learning from a theoretical view
point, since some learning may have occurred, and its effects
are indeterminable.

As Cherry notes, however,

We may nevertheless take ensemble-averages, on the
assumption that an ensemble of operators will change,
or learn, in nearly-like manner, under the same test
conditions,
Since Shepard did exactly this, and the ancillary assumption
seems reasonably justified, the fourth assumption is also
met.
Assumption five, that the alphabet of signs remains
unchanged, is clearly satisfied if no foreign or ’’new15 words
are used, a 11practical" assumption*
Thus this study appears to meet all of the assump
tions of information theory, if only indirectly through
several additional assumptions about human beings.

The prob

lems in accepting some of the additional assumptions shall
be discussed later.
Noise
The second category of uses of information theory
in interpersonal communication research is that in which

26 Ibid., p, 179.
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noise plays a central role.

As mentioned in the previous

chapter, however, little of the research in which noise is
an independent variable relates directly to interpersonal
communication.

Those studies that do so relate appear

primarily to be audio psychophysical threshold experiments
or variations.

Such a study, previously discussed, is one

by Miller, Heise, and Lichten.2^ As they point out,
There are three classes of variables involved in an
articulation test: the personnel. talkers and listen
ers j the test materials, syllables, words, sentences
or continuous discourse; and the communication equip
ment, rooms. microphones, amplifiers, radios, earphones,
etc* ®
Virtually all of the experiments utilizing information
measures, as Miller Heise and Lichten*s, are concerned with
the second of these.
They conducted their study as follows:
A random noise voltage^ was introduced at the lis
teners 1 earphones, and the signal-to-noise ratio was varied
by changing the level of the noise and leaving the voice
level constant.

Three types of test material were used:

digits, sentences, and nonsense syllables.

Two subjects,

familiar with the design of the study, located in different
rooms connected only by the electronic communication chan
nel, were used tnroughout the experiment, alternately as

^Miller, Heise, and Lichten.
29 100-7,000 Hz,

2 ^lbid,, p. 329
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listener and speaker*

Six signal-to-noise ratios were used

(-1 2 , -6 , 0 , +6 , +1 2 , + 1$ db) with six sizes of test vocabu
laries (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, or 256 words).

The speaker read

over the communication channel the messages randomly selected
from the various vocabularies under the different S/N
ratios, and the listener checked off what he heard on a
list of all possible alternatives.
The results of this experiment showed thatthe digits
were

easiest to correctly understand, followed

a sentence, and then the nonsense syllables.

bywords in

Miller, Heise,

and Lichten concluded that "the most important variable pro
ducing the differences is the range of possible alternatives
from which a test item is selected.3*3
A second experiment in the same study attempted to

directly test the hypothesis that an, index of difficulty
of discrimination can be developed not on the characteris
tics of the particular item, but upon the range of items
that could occur.

This range was varied by informing the

listener that each test word would be one of the items
from a given restricted vocabulary, and the S/N ratio was
varied for each of the conditions.

Results were again

consistent with theoretical predictions.
Since both parts of this study employed
the same information technique, it is

30lbid., p. 33 1 .

possible

essentially
toexamine
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them simultaneously.
The first assumption, that the description be en
tirely in the language of an external observer is easily
met.

Clearly, the experimenters were able in both experi

ments to determine the selection of the message and analyze
its reception using the answer sheet blanks.
Second, it is required that the scope of the analysis
be at a macroscopic level.

It is doubtful that the averaging

techniques over the small sample were adequate in this case.
In the first experiment, however, no figures are given indi
cating the number of responses required for each subject,
only the per cent correct.

It is thus impossible to conclude

that the assumption was or was not met, although since only
two subjects were used throughout the experiment, the latter
is more likely the case.

In addition, the lengths of the

passages were not specified except in the case of the sent
ences (five words).

lumber of trials was not specified in

the second experiment either, although in all cases only one
stimulus nwordl! was read at a time.

The very small number

of subjects may be indicative of insufficient averaging,
however, and it seems reasonable to suggest that it was
unlikely that this assumption could be met.
The third assumption, that the probabilities of the
signals are known to the external observer, is easily met
since the transmitted message was read from a prepared list
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in both experiments, and the responses were recorded.
Fourth, it is necessary that the message signals and
their probabilities are known to the communicants and that
they remain unchanged in time.

In the first experiment the

“built-in knowledge of English” assumption may be correctly
applied only in the second type of test material (the sentences). Even in this case, questions may be raised with
respect to the length of the samples used.31

But in consider

ing the digits and nonsense syllables, even with ’‘knowledge
able” subjects {i.e., those familiar with the techniques and
the theory of the experiment), the assumption does not ap
pear to be adequately satisfied.

It is likely, for example,

that the communicants may have been subject to the effects
of the “gamblerfs fallacy” in the case of the digits, and
indeterminable effects with the nonsense syllables.

The

second experiment was more clear-cut with respect to this
assumptionj only one stimulus word was given at a time, the
listeners know the size of the vocabulary and had a good
idea of the probability distribution (flat, when “random”
selection by the speaker is

a s s u m e d ) ,

32

Allowing for a

31 As previously mentioned, there is no information,
except in the case of the five word sentences, of the length
of the samples. If they were of different lengths, a bias
may have been introduced.
32It would probably be incorrect to assume a random
selection on the part of the speaker, but if such an argu
ment were made, it might be possible to invoke the “identi
cal twin” assumption of Shannon, though its applicability
in this situation may be questioned.
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degree of non-random selection on the part of the speakers,
it seems reasonable to suggest that this assumption is satis
fied for the second experiment, although not in the case of
the firsto
The last assumption, that the alphabet of signs re
mains unchanged, is easily satisfied for both experiments.33
Capacity and Transmission
The third method of applying information theory to
interpersonal speech communication is in the area of capa
city and transmission#

It is in this area that the appli

cation of information measures is most controversial, due
in large part to some basic problems which arise in describ
ing the channel.

Some of these problems have been considered

in Chapter III, and more discussion follows in this chapter,
as well as later.
An illustrative experiment is provided by Irwin Pol
lack, who compared repetition procedures for Improving com
munication in noise with network procedures.3^

The repetition

33fj0te that for each size of vocabulary a different
experiment is performed; the results being combined in the
conclusions.
3^-Irwin Pollack, ’’Message Procedures for Unfavorable
Communication Conditions,” Journal of the Acoustical Society
of America. 30 (195$) > pp. 196’-2d’l.
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procedures for improving communication in noise merely re
quires that the speaker repeat the stimulus word ("target
wofd") several times.

The network procedure, on the other

hand, employs an elimination process based on the informa
tion theory principle that
The reception of a message from among a small ensem
ble of messages may be accomplished correctly at a lower
speech-to-noise (S/N) ratio than the same selection from
a large ensemble of messages.35
A "target vocabulary1’ of 64 words was employed in
both the repetition and the network procedures.

The talker

repeated the sequence (successive binary selections for the
network, and repetition of the target word in the repetition
procedure) until all listeners had received the message, or
until 70 seconds elapsed.

Thus, if the target word were

’’firefly” (see Figure 3)» in the network procedure the single
word ’’firefly” would be repeated over and over, while in
the network procedure, the words ’’cargo, duckpond, firefly”
would be repeated.

Words on the list were arranged alpha

betically, and the talker read at the rate of one word per
second.

The talker selected the target word from a pack of

cards, announced ’’ready” over a noise-free channel, and then
switched on noise^ before proceeding with the reading.

The

listeners’ clocks were started and ran until he was ’’reason
ably confident” of having received the message correctly,
35lbid.. p. 197 .
36y/hite noise at an overall level of 90 db Spl.

and at that time he deflected a switch which stopped his
assigned clock.

The listener recorded the time and the

received word.

Figure 3
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„ - ICEBERG
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^ .MOUSETRAP
N -OXCART tj>< """
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S T A R L I G H T _
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Results of the experiment showed the network proced
ure to be somewhat more efficient, thus confirming the expert
mental hypothesis.
Analysing the study with respect to the first assump
tion, which requires that the description be entirely in the
language of an external observer, it is found that the assump
tion is satisfied.

The experimenter was able to observe the

selection of the message and also the message received.

n
The second assumption states that the theory is con
cerned only with average, or macroscopic properties of a
system.

The five participants who served alternately as

listener and speaker over a four month period with ten
hours of testing per week amassed a considerable amount of
data. 3 ?

Since these results were averaged over the whole

period of time, the second assumption is also met.
The third assumption, that the probabilities of the
signals are known to the external observer and that the
noise sources can be identified, is met.

The experimenter

knew which words were spoken, which words were received,
and had previously specified the noise source and frequen
cies.
Fourth, the assumption is made that the communicants
operate with an agreed set of message signs having definite
frequencies of occurrence, and that these probabilities re
main unchanged in time.

Both the talker and the listener

had before them a complete vocabulary of the 64 spoken words,
and their probabilities of occurrence were known to be ran
dom,

Thus the assumption is also met.
The last assumption, that the alphabet of signs re

mains unchanged, is clearly satisfied.

3?3ome 500 trials were run for the determination of
the per cent of words correct under three signal-to-noise
ratios with both the repetition and the network procedures.
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Thus the experiment meets all of the assumptions of
information theory.

It should be pointed out, however,

that many of the problems suggested by Cherry were circum
vented by using an electronic communication channel, and
not considering the human operator as a channel*

In the

following experiment Pollack also attempts to avoid those
problems by suggesting a different sort of communication
channel, again not the human operator.^
In this experiment he investigated the effects of
sequentially encoded information on the rate of assimilation.39
The proposed relation of information theory to the experi
mental situation was as follows:
The message-set is composed of identifiable symbols—
English consonants and numerals; choice is based on a
table of random numbers; the transmitter is a talker;
the channel is the oath of the sound1waves; the receiver
is an £ who listens to the message and, after the message
has been presented, records it at the destination on
the answer sheet.40
This process is schematized in Figure 4.
Messages were Selected from an alphabet of English

3&Cherry‘s analysis of the problems encountered in
considering the human operator analogous to a communication
channel are felt to be sufficient to clarify problems in
this area, and thus no attempt will be made to analyze such
a study in this category.
•aq
' Irwin Pollack, ”Assimilation of Sequentially En
coded Information,1’ American Journal of Psychology. 66
(1953).
40lbid., p. 42 1 .
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Figure 4

source
transmitter receiver
channel
destination

choice

letters
numerals

random
numbers

talker

listener
air

answer
sheet

consonants and numerals using a table of random numbers.
The lengths of the messages varied from 4 to 24 units, each
unit in the message being selected from a given number of
alternatives (2, 4,

1 6 , or 30).

The messages were read,

via a tape recorder, to 25 subjects over a period of ’’many
days,” each subject serving no more than one hour per day*
Before each message was presented, the length of the mes
sage and the number of possible alternatives per messageunit was announced.
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Results were tabulated in bits error output,41 and
showed principally that
the information lost per message-unit (i.e., the error
output) increases as the length of the message increases,
and as the number of possible alternatives per message
unit increases,42
The first assumption, that the external observer
must be able to observe the whole of the communication pro
cess, is satisfied.

Clearly, the experimenter knew the

messages sent, since it was he that selected them, and the
answer sheets completed by the listener provided him with
the received messages.
The second assumption states that the theory is con
cerned only with average, macroscopic properties of a sys
tem, and not with specific, momentary properties.

The experi

menter used 25 subjects, and taking this subject ensemble,
averaged over many trials.

One question with respect to

this assumption concerns the distribution of the trials.

In

Pollack’s experiment no subject participated more than one
hour on any single day.

This practice distribution may be

thought to have interrupted the probabilities of responses,
but it is more likely that increased durations of practice

41«The information lost by the receiver, here called
the informational error output, or, more briefly, the error
output, is the discrepancy between the input to the receiver
and the output from the receiver,” Ibid., p. 425.

42ibid., p. 42g,

7$

would have been more problematic due to the deeline of com
petence normally observed in massed practice distributions.43
The assumption, then, is met.
The third assumption, that the external observer has
made good estimates of the transmitted and received signals
is also satisfied.

Since all of the data was recorded with

respect to signals received and sent, the experimenter had
thorough knowledge of these probabilities and was able to
accurately compute the error-output.
Fourth, it is required that the communicants operate
with an agreed set of signs, and that the signs remain un
changed with the passage of time,

bsually, it was found

that this assumption could b© satisfied by assuming that
users of English had built-in language statistics.

Since,

however, Pollack used consonants and numerals with varying
selection ensembles, the assumption cannot be satisfied in
the same manner.

Attempting to clarify this problem, the

experimenter nindoctrinated” his subjects in the use of
tables of random numbers, showed them the method of selec
tions of the messages, and before each trial told them the
size of the selection ensemble and the length of the message,
ni,e., the Ss were given full knowledge of the statistical

^3ee Robert S. Woodworth, and Harold Schlosberg,
Experimental Psychology (Rev. Ed.), (Hew York: Holt Rine
hart, and Winsom, 1964;, pp. 736-794.
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characteristics of the message-source.

It is question

able, however, that this knowledge was as complete as was
expected, or if it was, whether the subjects used that knowl
edge.

That is, it is unlikely that merely by telling the

subjects a message of a certain length would be selected
from an ensemble of a certain size, that those subjects would
be able to alter their prior expectations with respect to a
familiar alphabet.

The assumption, then, cannot be said to

be satisfied.
The fifth assumption states that the alphabet of
signs remains unchanged.

While this was not true over the

whole experiment, in the determination of the error-output
for each size ensemble, the alphabet was unchanged*^

The

assumption is then satisfied.
The experiment discussed above suggests an additional
problem common to many studies.

The model of the communica

tion process employed, that of the source selecting the mes
sage, passing it to the sender, which transmits signals over
a channel to a receiver, and thence to the destination, of
ten does not have "adequate” correspondence with the nfact-

Pollack, p. 4 2 7 .
this experiment, as in most of those discussed
here, each variation can be considered as a separate experi
ment.

BO

territory” it represents.^
Other Studies
It was noted in the last chapter that a number of
investigators have attempted to use informational concepts
in some rather peculiar ways, and that often results ob
tained from these analyses were highly ambiguous with respect
to the application of the theory.

In this section an exam

ination of two of the studies shall be undertaken in the
same manner as was done for those in the three sections pre
ceding.
A study by James Owen is illustrative of a number of
the problems arising from these questionable applications of
information theory.

Owen proposed to "investigate the ef

fect of ,uncertainty* on the behavior of individuals who are
listening to an informative speech."^7

Auditor retention of

an informative speech was to be tested under two conditions

^ It should also be noted that in experiments in
which the human being is compared to a communication chan
nel, the problem of controlling the input to that "ehannel"
becomes monumental. Thus an experiment in which a ring of
lamps are used as the stimulus may assume (tacitly) that
there are no other input terminals or that such additional
information input is negligible or irrelevant. As Cherry
has noted, this is highly unlikely, since ,{a human operator
is not an integrated organism." Cherry, "Applying Informa
tion Theory . . . ," p. 17&,
^7James L. Owen, "The Effect of fReceiver Uncertainty1
on Message Retention," paper delivered at the 196? Convention
of the Speech Association of America. (Mimeographed.)

of "uncertainty,” one of stimulus uncertainty and the other
of response uncertainty.
Two tape-recorded thirteen-minute informative speeches
were prepared; one as it was delivered, and one in which a
signal was introduced immediately prior to any sentence or
phrase which contained information relevant to twenty-five
multiple choice questions based on the speech.

This cued

tape was said to have significantly reduced the amount of
stimulus uncertainty compared to the other un-cued tape.
Response uncertainty was manipulated by the ordering of the
twenty-five test questions,

In one set of tests, the ques

tions were given in exactly the order in which they were
answered in the speeches, while in the other the order of
the same twenty-five questions was randomized.

It was sug

gested that "subjects employing the ordered list . . .
would experience significantly less response uncertainty
than subjects employing the random list. . . ."4$
In one experimental condition, thirty subjects were
given time to study the twenty-five randomly ordered ques
tions, were played the cued tape of the speech, and were
then given twenty minutes to answer the questions.

The

other experimental group (twenty-eight Ss) was given the
sequentially ordered set of questions, played the un-cued

$2

tape, and tested similarly.

A control group (twenty-six

3s) was given the randomly ordered questions and the uncued
tape.

The results confirmed Owen’s hypothesis that an in

crease in either stimulus or response uncertainty signifi
cantly decreases auditor retention of an informative speech.
Analyzing the study with respect to the assumptions
of information theory, problems arise immediately.

The first

assumption, that the external observer must be able to view
both ends of the channel, seems at first glance to be easily
met.

But at the receiving end, the destination is found to

be converting the signals received only part of the time;
i.e., those signals which were received, but not tested,
were not observed by the external observer.

Hence the obser

ver could not be said to have complete knowledge of all that
was sent and received.

Moreover, the conversion itself was

probably not one-to-one with what the receiver received.
That is, that in the process of answering the questions con
cerning the speech, it is likely that the subjects may have
had to alter their receivers ensemble in order to make the
appropriate responses to the questions.

The first assump

tion, then, is not satisfied.
Second, it is required that the analysis be on a
macroscopic level.

Owen’s averaging techniques would nor

mally have fulfilled this assumption, but the fact that he
was unable to determine the receivers ’ ensembles in their
totality, as per assumption one, means that while the
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statistical techniques may have been appropriate, they could
not have included all of the data.

Thus this assumption is

not met.
The third assumption states that the external observer
must have made good estimates of the probabilities of occur
rence of the sent and received signals, and noise.

As with

the last assumption, this cannot be met, since Owen's study
did not account for all of the received signals.
Fourth, it is required that the statistics of the
situation remain stationary.

In Owen's study subjects were

required to answer a series of questions related to the
speech.

As he suggests, it is likely that the groups using

the randomly ordered series of questions experienced some
what more uncertainty than those in which the questions were
ordered.

But it is to be noted that in answering each suc

cessive question, the uncertainty of the response ensemble
declined.

That is, while in answering the first question,

the subjects' uncertainty was at a maximumj but once the
first question was answered, the subjects knew that they
would not be required to answer that question again, and
therefore the probability of occurrence became zero.

Simi

larly, as each question was answered, the uncertainty with
respect to the yet unanswered questions decreased, so that
after the twenty-fourth question was answered, the subjects'
uncertainty was zero;

the next relevant statement could

answer only the single remaining question.

Hence the
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statistics of the situation were not stationary, and the
assumption is not met.
The last assumption states that the alphabet of
signs must remain unchanged.

In Owen’s study the alphabet

of signs is, of course, the English language, and does re
main unchanged.

This assumption is satisfied.

Owen’s study points up a number of difficulties in
volved in taking a mathematical theory with a clearly de
fined model, and employing the mathematics without carefully
investigating the basis of the system itself.

Another study

which illustrates many of the same problems is one by Hower
Hsia,

He proposed to "evaluate channel behavior in terms of

output, recalled information, error, and equivocation inter
acting with constraint and noise factor”^

in audio, visual,

and audio-visual teaching methods.
Ten verses of English poetry with varying amounts
of distributional information were selected from ten wellknown poets, ranging from ten to twenty-eight words in
length.

Each verse was presented in two forms:

one in

which the words were randomly scrambled ("nonconstrained"
stimuli), and one as in the original ("constrained" stimuli).

^Hower J, Hsia, "Auditory, Visual, and Audiovisual
Information Processing in Terras of Output, Error, Equivoca
tion, and Recalled Information," paper delivered at the
Association for Educators in Journalism. (Mimeographed.)
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Both sets of stimuli were administered under six conditions
in combination with channel treatments (auditory, visual,
and audiovisual), and the noise factor (noise and no noise
conditions).

In the auditory channel, white noise ’’about

twenty-five per cent of the intensity of the auditory stim
uli” was introduced, while in the visual channel, noise con
sisted of ”random black dots scattered over visual stimuli,
blacking out about twenty-five per cent of the visual
space.”50

For the simultaneous audio-visual presentation,

both types of noise were combined.

After the presentations,

subjects (seventh grade students) were asked to write down
what they remembered.

Results showed significant differ

ences between all groups.
Analyzing the study with respect to the first assump
tion, that the external observer must be able to observe
both ends of the channel, it is found that the assumption
is satisfied.

The observer could see all of the stimulus

material, and responses were written by subjects which could
be studied by the experimenter.

The difficulty which was

met with in the last study was not apparent in this ease,
since there was adequate opportunity for the subjects to
record all of their responses.
The second assumption, that the results must be

^Ibid.. p. 4.

averaged and stated in statistical terms is satisfied in
noting that a total of 192 students was used in the experi
ment , and responses for each group were averaged over those
subjects and stated as averages.
Third, it is required that the external observer has
made good estimates of the probabilities of occurrence of
the signals, and has a complete statistical knowledge of the
noise*

While it was the case that the experimenter knew the

probabilities of occurrence of the signals, a question arises
concerning his knowledge of the noise.

Auditory noise was

probably adequately specified, but the visual noise consisting
of random black dots on the visual material appeared to be
of questionable specificity.

In fact, beyond the fact that

it "blacked out twenty-five per cent" of the material, nothing
at all can be said about it in statistical terms.

Hence the

assumption cannot be satisfied.
The fourth assumption states that the communicants
operate with an agreed set of signs having known definite
frequencies of occurrence.

Normally, this assumption would

be easily satisfied, but in the case of this study, Hsia
deliberately introduced poetry into the material assuming
that "seventh grade students . . . are not very well versed
In poetry,"51

This is directly contrary to the assumption,

and it is not, then, satisfied.
51ibid,« p. 3.
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Fifth, it is required that the alphabet of signs re
mains unchanged*

This assumption is satisfied, since no

new or additional material was introduced into the experi
ment while it was under way.
While Hsia’s study meets all but one of the assump
tions of information theory, the fact is that he did not
really use the theory at all.

What appears to have happened

is that some informational concepts were associated with
some of the measures in his experiment, and the term informa
tion theory was applied in the study without regard to what,
in fact, was happening.

This problem has reached almost

critical proportions in much research in the area*

It is

not difficult to find studies under the name of ’’information
theory,” which, as this one, have virtually no relation to
the formal theory at all.
In the following chapter consideration will be given
to several of the problems which have arisen during the
course of the analyses conducted above.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS:

PARAMETERS OF APPLICABILITY

In the last chapter several studies in communication
research were analyzed with respect to whether the design
and execution of the studies were in keeping with the as
sumptions of information theory.

The present chapter shall

undertake an examination, on a more general level, of the
assumptions of the theory with respect to research situa
tions , and point out some general problems encountered in
applying information theory to experimental research.

From

the results of such an examination some conclusions shall
be drawn concerning the application of information theory
in experimental interpersonal communication research.
It is clear that information theory has provided an
impetus for scientific investigations in the area of inter
personal communication.

The suggestion that communicative

activities may, in part, be quantified, is probably most
responsible for the increase in activity in this area; and
there is little doubt that information theory has been a
vital stimulus.

As the previous chapters have shown, how

ever, the application of a mathematical theory to research
situations does not consist simply of plugging values into
an equation and grinding out truths about how human beings
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communicate with each other.

While it may well be the case

that a great deal of valuable information can be gleaned
from applications of questionable validity, progress baaed
on such work must necessarily be limited.

The next three

sections of this chapter consist of an examination of the
three areas of application of information theory techniques
discussed in Chapters III and IV, particularly with refer
ence to the limitations of applicability of the theory.
Sequential Dependencies
This area of application of information theory is
at the same time the most promising and the most perplex
ing.

Clearly, the grammatical structure of a language rep

resents a set of statistical constraints, and redundancy is,
to a degree, measurable.

As seen in Chapter III, letter re

dundancy is estimable, and upper and lower bounds of lang
uage redundancy can also be set.
Uses of redundancy in experimental situations are
many and varied.^

Among the most interesting are the

’’probability tests” discussed in Chapter III and employed
in the Miller and Selfridge experiment analyzed in Chapter
IV.

It was shown there, however, that not all uses of

^See George A. Miller, language and Communication
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951)> especially Chap
ter 5, and Miller, ’’What is Information Measurement?”
American Psychologist, 8 (1953), pp. 3-11.
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redundancy are ambiguous.
misapplied.

Even the term itself has been

Binder and Wolin point out that while Weaver

has explicitly defined "redundancy," some investigators
have modified the definition to suit their purposes or have
allowed themselves to be misled by fortuitous examples,
thus introducing additional confusion.^
Beyond this, however, several important points emerge
with respect to these studies.
First, Miller and Selfridge’s method of generation
of "probability texts" has been questioned.

Since this

issue has been previously discussed, and studies cited which
seem to support the validity of the method, it is assumed
here that no serious error will result from the use of the
method.
Second, is the question of scoring the tests.

It has

been suggested that this type of study, in fact, examines
only one type of uncertainty (or constraint), that which
E. R. F, V. Crossman calls the "selective source-entropy."3
Crossman notes that the order of reproduction is an impor
tant part of immediate memory often overlooked by informa
tion theorists, but if it is considered, the "total source-

^Binder and Wolin, pp. 46-49.
^E. E. F. W. Crossman, "Information and Serial Order
in Human Immediate Memory," Information Theory Fourth London
Symposium, ed. Colin Cherry (London:Butterworths, 1961),
147-159.
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entropy” {the sum of the "selective” and the "order sourceentropy” ) generally gives better approximations of the ex
perimental data.^ While these observations do not affect
the validity of the Miller and Selfridge type of application
of the information model, it does suggest that caution is
needed in interpreting the results*
Third, there is a question of word-complexity,

E. B*

Coleman has noted that "analyzing an extensive sample of ap
proximations suggested that their individual words may be
come more and more uncommon and more complex after about the
sixth

order.”5

That is, that as the order of approximation

increases above the sixth order, the words which form the
lists tend to become more "difficult to learn" than even
actual English text.

This, Coleman suggests, would tend to

discredit the basis of Miller and Selfridge’s conclusion that
there is a leveling off of the learning curve at about the
fifth order approximation, since the increasing word-complexlty
would tend to counterbalance the effect of the language asso
ciation.

Coleman concludes with ah experiment in which he

found that
^■Grossman gives the following formulae for computing
the entropy of lists:
Selective source-entropy = Hs(s)=n loggS bits per list
Order source-entropy
= Hq (s,)“ loggn^ bits per list
Total source-entropy
=
(S)= Hs(S)+H0 (S)bits per list,
B. Coleman, "Approximations to English: Come Com
ments on the Method,” American Journal of Psychology, 76
(1963), 239-247, p. 242.
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when passages were matched in word-coraplexity, higher
percentages were recalled as the passages approached
the statistical structure of language, and there was no
leveling off at fifth-order approximations. Furthermore,
as recall was scored in longer and longer sequences, the
effect of long-range constraints became more and more ap
parent .®
In addition, Garner points out that in those experi
ments in which a single passage is learned by the subject,
even if the single passage is long, it is not correct to
talk about the redundancy of that passage, since there is no
specified "parent population" from which this passage is
drawn.

If, however,

the passage is generated by introducing sequential
restrictions between the words which can be generated,
we can consider such a passage to be redundant by ex
actly the same reasoning that we use to estimate the
redundancy of a real language, namely by estimating the
average uncertainty of the elements , , . in the single
passage. In such a case, the actual measurement of the
amount of redundancy is a measurement of the redundancy
of an assumed subset of passages which could have been
generated, and from which this particular passage was
drawn.7
If a set of words is used in which constraining rules
operate on the generation of the words themselves, but
not between the words within the material,
redundancy cannot be defined solely in terms of the let
ter constraints operating within the words, but must be
defined in terms of the number of words in the set com
pared to the number which could have been generated.$
In this type of situation, then, the experiment was on the

6Ibid.« p. 247.
%bid., pp. 274-275.

^Garner, p, 274

form of the redundancy rather than the amount of it, since
the difference between a list of words constructed by random
selection of letters and a list in which the selection was
constrained (but from the same parent population) ” . ♦ .
lies not in how much selection (redundancy) was used, but
rather in which particular words were selected*"9 The re
dundancy, therefore, is the same.
The ability to replace missing elements in a language,
as in the Shepard experiment, depends on two factors;

there

must exist in the stimulus material an amount of structure
or redundancy; and second, the subject must know the parti
cular signification rules which are operative with the given
amount of structure.^

As Garner points out:

The chief value of these experiments is in demonstra
ting that humans do understand the nature of their own
language, and that their understanding affects perform
ance involving verbal stimuli and even responses. How
ever, these experiments fail, in large part, to attack
the more fundamental problem, which is to determine the
value and role of redundancy (as amount and as form) in
perception and learning,'*
That is, if an experiment were conducted in which
subjects were required to learn two sets of words, one set
actual English words and the other formed by random selec
tion of letters,
it is obvious that English speaking subjects will

9Ibid., p. 275.
11 Ibid., p. 230,

t0Ibid,, p. 280
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learn, by free recall, the set of actual English words
much faster than the set of nonsense words. We might
even be tempted to say that we have demonstrated that
redundant words are learned more easily than non-redundant words, but this seductive conclusion is quite
wrong. In actuality, these two sets of words have ex
actly the same amount of redundancy. We have only dem
onstrated that familiar words are easier to learn than
unfamiliar ones, and have demonstrated absolutely nothing
about the role of redundancy in free-recall learning,12
Thus, until direct evidence is found concerning the
effect of the amount of redundancy on learning (by keeping
stimulus uncertainty constant while changing the amount of
redundancy), little can be said with certainty concerning
this type of application of information theory.
Hoise
Due to the lack of experimentation in this area,
again little can be said with certainty*

It is possible,

however, to examine some of the reasons for this lack.
First, there are difficulties in applying the information
transmission measure to speech intelligibility work when
small sizes of vocabulary are used.

Garner notes that

when we are obtaining loudness judgments . . . it is
quite simple to select four intensities over a speci
fied range— and these same four intensities can be
used throughout the particular experiment. In a speech
experiment, however, we cannot select just four mono
syllables since we cannot be sure that the results we
obtain are independent of language sampling factors.
Therefore, in the usual experiment, a single set of
words is not ordinarily used. Rather on each presenta
tion the subject is told which words are possible on

12Ibid.
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that presentation, and the set of possible words is
changed over the course of the experiment so that, in
sofar as possible, all words are paired with all other
words in the set. This sort of precaution is necessary
to prevent artifactually high (or low) accuracies due
to chance factors in using groups of words which are
highly discriminatory from each other, but not from
words used in other sets.13
The Miller, Heise, and Lichten study examined in the last
chapter illustrates some of these difficulties.

It was

found that the fourth assumption could not be satisfied due
to the unknown Influence of the language sampling factors
and the subjects* possible responses to that sampling.
Previously noted were a number of observations by
Cherry'll

respect to this type of application.

The

fact that the input terminals of the human being are not
'independent introduces, again, factors which are difficult
to either measure or control.

For example, in the Miller,

Heise, and Lichten experiment it was impossible to deter
mine the effects that the environmental conditions (other
than auditory) may have had on the subjects.
In the analysis of this experiment in Chapter IV,
it was mentioned that the ’’built-in knowledge of English”
assumption could not be said to hold for parts of the ex
periment,

That is, while it would be justified to assume

13Ibid., p. 79.
1^E. C. Cherry, ”0n the Validity . . . ," pp. 178179.
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that the subjects knew the probabilities of occurrence of
the stimuli made up of words in a sentence, it was improb
able that they had any clear conception of the probabili
ties of occurrence of the stimuli composed of digits and
nonsense syllables.
This experiment also suggests one of the basic prob
lems in assuming that merely advising the subjects of the
size of the ensemble assures the experimenter that those
subjects in fact use this information.

Such nknowledgeable

subjects" would very likely be influenced by previous trials,
prior learning, and other factors which might cause them to
respond quite unlike one who had a good knowledge of the
stimuli probabilities.

The essential point here is that

human subjects, unlike electrical communication systems,
learn, and the test conditions may not remain stationary
with time.
It must be remembered, of course, in considering
the applications of information theory in the area of noise,
that this paper has not given treatment to advanced analyses
of speech signals and other areas of experimental phonetics
and acoustics.

It may well be the case that in those areas

the problems encountered here could be easily surmounted.
Capacity and Transmission
The most controversial applications of information
theory in interpersonal communication have been in the

97

area of capacity and transmission.

Cherry’s discussion of

some important points concerning these applications were men
tioned in Chapter III, and for that reason studies were se
lected in which the human operator was not considered analo
gous to a communication channel.

But, as the analyses in

Chapter I? have shown, other problems occur.

These other

problems result principally from the attempt to use the com
munication system described by Shannon and Weaver as a con
ceptual research model.

An implicit assumption in Pollack’s

experiment^ is that the message set (of numerals and conson
ants) are semantically neutral in terms of the subjects’
responses to them,

That is, that the subjects would respond

as if the selections by the source were made according to a
table of random numbers.

The fact, however, that letters

were used in the experiment probably affected the validity
of this assumption.

There can be no doubt that the subjects’

prior familiarity with the stimulus material might well have
played a role in their ability to recall the material in the
test.
Garner has suggested an additional problem in this
type of experiment, that of the discriminability.^ Essen
tially, it is pointed out that the range of stimulus values

15pollack, ’’The Assimilation of Sequentially Encoded
Information.”
^Garner, p. 76-77.

9$

must be broad enough so that the subject can determine the
differences between the stimuli.

While in Pollack’s experi

ment this was not a relevant factor, many experiments might
be affected by the problem.

In auditory discrimination ex

periments, for example, if a frequency range of between 1000
and 1002 Hz is used, there will be little if any information
transmitted because of a complete failure of discrimination
due to the extremely small range of stimuli.

Similarly,

visual stimuli should be spaced equally according to a cri
terion of discriminability.^?
Another major problem here, as in most applications
of information theory, is that of learning.

Usually it is

assumed that learning does not play an important part in
determining information transmission or channel capacity,
but as Garner points out, often this is not the case.^
Luce is even more emphatic about this problem,^ as is
Chronbach.^®

The issue here is that while the mathematical

theory of communication requires that the frequencies of
occurrence of the responses remain unchanged in time (that
is, that the statistics of the situation are stationary),

^Wendel Garner and Harold Hake, "The Amount of In
formation in Absolute Judgments,” Psychological Review. 5$
(1951), pp. 446-459.
^Garner, pp. 77-7$.
^Chronbach, pp. 14-26.

^Luce, p. 50.
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in many, if not most psychological experiments which employ
information theory, learning on the part of the subjects
affects their conceptions of those probabilities.

Every

thing a human operator learns may affect his responses and
his expectations about events in the future.

If, then,

subjects change their expectations of these events, the
situation can no longer be said to be stationary, and the
mathematical theories based on that assumption are no longer
validly applicable.
The Problems of Meaning
It would be impossible to discuss the role of infor
mation theory in communication without some reference to
the concept of meaning.

Since this problem is so broad

in scope, the treatment here shall be only cursory, indica
ting some of the basic considerations.
it is well known that, as Shannon has said, "semantic
aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering
problem."21

That is, that information theory is not con

cerned with the "meaningfulness” of what was said, but with
the problem of transmission of what might have been said.
On the other hand, as Weaver points out in the same volume,
"this does not mean that the engineering aspects are neces
sarily irrelevant to the semantic

a spects.

21 Shannon and Weaver, p. 31 •

"22

In particular.

^ Ibid.. p. S.
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he says, nthis /informationalj analysis has so penetratlngly
cleared the air that one is now, perhaps for the first time,
ready for a real theory of meaning.'f23
In a paper delivered to the 1967 convention of the
Speech Association of America, Donald Darnell attempted to
connect the concept of meaning to information theory through
the term "ambiguity."^4

He pointed out that

Shannon has defined information or uncertainty as a
function of the number of possible alternatives and
their probabilities. True, he was speaking of the alter
native symbols that could occur on the text transmission
and their probabilities of occurrence. But the same
mathematical function defines '’ambiguity,” if we consider
the possible alternative interpretations of a message and
their probabilities. That is, a message with only one
conceivable interpretation is not ambiguous. A message
with more than one possible interpretation is somewhat
ambiguous, the more possible interpretations there are
the more ambiguous it is, and a message is maximally
ambiguous when all of its possible interpretations are
equally probable (or equally well justified).25
Darnell continues by noting that this "ambiguity”
is in many respects very similar to what William Aleton
calls "vagueness.” A terra is vague, Alston says, "if there
are cases in which there is no definite answer as to whether

23Ibid., p. 27.
^Donald K. Darnell, "Meaning and Information Theory,"
(unpublished paper delivered to the 1967 convention of the
Speech Association of America).
25Ibid., p. 2.
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the term

a p p l i e s .

”26

Thus the terra ’’middle-aged” is vague,

since there is no clearly delineated age (in years, months,
etc.) when one is middle-aged.

Informational measures,

Darnell thinks, might be useful in specifying the degree of
vagueness or ambiguity of such terras, giving the users of
language a better understanding of what is meant by vague
ness.2? This use of information measures falls into that
category which this paper has previously (p. 13) called
"structural information."
Other attempts to employ information theory to assist
in clarifying the term "meaning” have also been

m a d e . 2 $ » 2 9

Most investigators feel that the primary advantage in using
information measures in language experiments is that it
allows the experimenter to shift the problem from that of
"meaningfulness" to "degree of contextual constraint,"30

26williara P. Alston, Philosophy of Language. (Engle
wood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 34.
^?Alston points out that there are advantages to
vagueness; "Often our knowledge is such that we cannot
formulate what we know in terms that are maximaly precise
without falsifying the statement or going far beyond the
evidence," (p. 36). Diplomacy might be thougho of as the
art of being appropriately vague.
2^Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Rudolf Carnap, "Semantic
Information," Coiamunication Theory» Willis Jackson (New
York: Academic Press, Inc., 1953), pp. 503-512.
^Anatol Rapoport, "What is Information?" ETC. 10
(1953), 247-260.
3°Miller and Selfridge, p. 27.
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ignoring the "meaning” of the stimuli altogether, or assum
ing them to be semantically neutral*

As Cherry points out,

however, if the "meaningfulness" of the stimuli is ignored,
then an assumption is made that the response of the human
operator will depend only upon the range of choice they
offer and their probabilities of occurrence.

But

we cannot speak of the "probability" of a certain let
ter or word to a specific person, as a frequency. . . .
Probabilities, to him are "degrees of belief" and at
best may be rank-ordered, but are non-nuiaerical. But
the Theory of Communication takes probabilities as
relative frequencies. . , .31
It can be seen, then, that the problem of the rela
tionship between meaning and information theory (if, in fact,
there is any relationship at all) is one of the most critical
areas facing the application of informational concepts in
interpersonal communication.
Conclusions
The analyses of the studies in Chapter IV, and the
discussion of many of the problems that arose there in the
first sections of this chapter show clearly that there are
many problems, both large and small, to be considered before
an application of the mathematics of information theory can
be attempted in an experimental situation.
On the other hand, however, there is little doubt
that information theory has proven valuable in a great deal

^Cherry, "On the Validity . . .

p. 179.
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of research.

Perhaps, as Johnson and Klare indicate, its

most valuable use has been in the construction of models
of communication:
Of all single contributions to the widespread inter
est in models today, Shannon’s is the most important.
For the technical side of communication research, Shan
non’s mathematical formulations were the stimulus to
much of the later effort in this area. . . . Shannon
also presented a schematic diagram of a general commu
nication system, . . . which was the source of impetus
for many subsequent diagraraatic models of the general
communication problem.3k
Similarly, Shannon’s application of mathematics to
the problems of communication has served to generate an
interest in the potentialities of a rigorous mathematical
approach in communication research.

Nickerson^

points out

four separate uses of measures of uncertainty in experi
mental research, each measure, although different from each
other, being derived from Shannon’s formulation.
The difficulties which emerged during the course of
the analyses presented in this paper may be generally classi
fied into five categories:
Learning. Since the mathematical theory requires
that the situation be stationary in time, responses generated
Craig Johnson and George R, Klare, "General
Models of Communication Research: A Survey of the Develop
ments of a Decade,n Journal of Communication, 2 (1961), p. 15.
^Fiaymond s. Nickerson, A Note on the Concent of Un
certainty as Applied in Psychological Research(G. Hanscom
Field, Bedford, Mass.: Decision Sciences Laboratory, Elec
tronic Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, U.S. Air
Force. E3D-TR-65-222, October, 1965).

while learning is occurring do not form an adequate sample
from which the probabilities can be measured.

To some ex

tent, this problem may be dealt with by using an ensemble of
operators and assuming that these operators will learn and
change similarly.

It should be noted that information

theory, in contrast to this approach, requires an ensemble
of messages.

In general, however, since human beings learn

by experience and electrical communication systems do not,
experiments in which learning plays a prominent role in
determining probabilities of response should not be subjeeted to informational analysis.
Sampling. In experiments which require the analyses
of sequential dependencies it is very difficult to obtain
adequate estimates of the probabilities of occurrence of
the symbols except for very short sequences.

The number

of possible sequences of symbols increases at an exponential
rate as the length of the message increases, thus making
such estimates unreliable at higher orders of dependency.
Subjects. Even if no learning occurs and if ade
quate estimates of the probabilities of occurrence of the
symbols are available, it may well be the case that the
subjects in the experiment do not use the knowledge they
have.

That is, because a human subject is aware of the

probabilities of occurrence of the symbols, that knowledge
in itself is no guarantee that he will respond in accordance
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with those probabilities.

Information theory requires not

only that the subjects know the probabilities, but also
that they respond relative to those probabilities.

Unless,

then, the experimenter can be assured that the subjects will
respond always with respect to the probabilities of occur
rence of the stimuli, an informational analysis would be
inadvisable.
Message. The assumption which assumes macroscopic
averaging holds that in a noisy experimental situation the
messages must be infinitely long.

Human subjects, of course,

always must deal with finite messages.

While, as Luce points

out, this does not necessarily mean that the model gives
poor approximations for such cases, "it does suggest that
caution is

n e e d e d . "34

Meaning. The relationship between uncertainty and
meaning is at this point unclear.

If symbols are chosen

whose meaningfulness is assumed to be common among the popu
lation, then some sort of relationship between meaning and
uncertainty is implicitly assumed; but that relationship is
theoretically denied except through syntactics.

But if

meaningfulness is ignored, then it is assumed that the stim
uli are semantically neutral; and this is denied by previous

34Luce, p. 52
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experimentation^I
Other Studies*. Problems generated by the application*
or purported application, of informational concepts to inap
propriate research have seriously hindered the development
of the theory*

there are many other measures available which

could well be better than that of information*” and the re
cent upsurge of studies in *information theory11 are ofien
illustrative of bhatjpici*

the terns as well a® the theory

must be .used with great caret
Until these problems can he adequately dealt with In
experimental interpersonal conttmie&tlnn research (if* in
fact*, they can he)* the future of the .application of informa
tional analyses in this area* except m

s. conceptual model

of communication, is* at best* limited*

^%ee also ©berryfs discussion* p* 102 of this paper*
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